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IS KENDRA’S LAW A KEEPER? HOW
KENDRA’S LAW ERODES FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL
Erin O’Connor*
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, New York enacted legislation mandating involuntary
outpatient commitment for mentally ill individuals with a history
of noncompliance with treatment who are “unlikely to survive
safely in the community without supervision.”1 Outlining an
Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) program that includes
intensive community-based treatment under the court-ordered
supervision of a team of mental health professionals, the law,
commonly known as “Kendra’s Law,” was passed in response to
the tragic death of Kendra Webdale.2 Ms. Webdale was killed
when an individual with a long history of mental illness pushed
her onto the New York City subway tracks in front of an
oncoming train.3 Her death raised questions about the efficacy of
* C.S.W.; Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; M.S.S.W., Columbia
University, 1998; B.A., American University, 1996. The author would like to
thank her friends, colleagues at The Legal Aid Society – Capital Division, the
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy and her family for their support and
encouragement. A special thanks to her husband Brian for his unending love,
support, patience and cooking and cleaning.
1
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002). See also infra Part
I.B (discussing Kendra’s Law and outlining additional eligibility
requirements).
2
§ 9.60. See also discussion infra Part I.B (describing AOT in detail).
3
See, e.g., Maggie Haberman et al., Woman, 32, Is Pushed to Her Death
in Subway Horror, N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at 4; Bill Sanderson, Horror on
the Tracks: Woman Killed in Subway Nightmare, Pushed from Platform by

313

O'CONNORFINALMACRO2-26.DOC

314

4/1/03 2:46 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the mental health system, and public outrage spurred the law into
effect.4
Legislators designed Kendra’s Law to prevent future, similar
tragedies involving individuals with mental illness who are
noncompliant with treatment.5 Despite this effort, another woman
was seriously injured in 2001 when a severely mentally ill
individual pushed her onto the subway tracks in New York City’s
Grand Central Station.6 This incident, given the factual
similarities with Ms. Webdale’s death, naturally and justifiably
Man who had ‘Urge,’ N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at 2. Ms. Webdale was
dragged under the train and decapitated. Id. She died instantly. Id. A witness
reported that Goldstein said afterward, “Take me to the hospital. I’m crazy.”
K.C. Baker et al., Pushed to Her Death, Straphanger Shoved to Tracks, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999, at 3. Goldstein then waited quietly on the platform
for the police to arrive. Id. He did not resist arrest. Id.
4
Richard Lezin Jones, Suspect in Subway Attack Has a History of
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at D1 (recalling incidents of subway
riders pushed to their deaths by individuals with mental illness, most notably
the death of Ms. Webdale, which led to Kendra’s Law).
5
See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Speaker Silver Joins Attorney General Spitzer in Calling for Passage
of Kendra’s Law (May 19, 1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/1999/
may/may19c_99.html. Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver stated that “the
specific incident that inspired Kendra’s Law accurately depicts this as a public
safety issue,” but additionally the bill will assist “the thousand of families who
have nowhere to turn when a loved one is refusing to participate in medical
treatment plans.” Id. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer added, “[t]he way things
stand now, we must wait for a tragedy to take place before we can get the
mentally ill the help they need.” Id. Kendra’s mother, Patricia Webdale,
emphatically urged the Legislature to enact Kendra’s Law to “reduc[e] the
number of potential victims” of the mentally ill. Id.
6
Jones, supra note 4. On November 15, 2001, Jackson Roman pushed
Latchmie Ramsamy into the path of an oncoming train at Grand Central
Station. Id. Ms. Ramsamy lost a foot and suffered other injuries. Id. Mr.
Roman had been released in October 2001 from a psychiatric hospital after a
yearlong stay. Id. It is unknown if he was under an AOT order at the time of
this incident. Id. He was supposed to be in a supervised outpatient mental
health program, but he had left it without authorization. Id. The directors of
the program had been looking for him but had not yet contacted the police. Id.
See also discussion infra Part III.C (examining the effectiveness of Kendra’s
Law).
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implicated the effectiveness of Kendra’s Law and New York’s
AOT program.7
Although beneficial to many individuals with mental illness,
New York’s AOT provision extends beyond protecting society
from dangerous mentally ill individuals to infringing upon the
rights of those with mental illness who pose no threat. Although
Kendra’s Law provides legal representation for all individuals at
hearings, the right to counsel is diminished by other aspects of
the law.8 By subjecting an individual who refuses treatment to
serious consequences, including arrest and hospitalization, the
law infringes on an individual’s right to determine his own course
of treatment, particularly the right to refuse medication.9

7

See Sean Gardiner, Psychiatric Motive? Subway Suspect Tells Cops He
Pushed Woman to Get Mental Help, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 2001, at A7 (stating
that Mr. Roman told investigators that he pushed Ms. Ramsamy because he
was desperate for psychiatric help); Patricia Hurtado, History of Convictions,
Treatment: Subway Suspect Had Been in Jail, Also Spent Time in Mental
Facilities, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 2001, at A26 (comparing the history of Mr.
Roman and Mr. Goldstein and suggesting that, despite Kendra’s Law,
hospitals discharge dangerous patients without court orders); see also Robert
Kolker, Diagnosis: Insanity, CITY LIMITS, May 2000 (arguing that the
mentally ill want to go to jail in order to receive mental health services), http:
//www.citylimits.org/content/articles/articleView.cfm?articlenumber=824.
8
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2002). See also
discussion infra Part II.B (discussing how the right to counsel is eroded by the
limitations placed on the ability of counsel to effectively represent the interest
of patients).
9
§ 9.60(n).
Where in the clinical judgment of a physician, the patient has failed
or has refused to comply . . . such physician may request the
director . . . to direct the removal of such patient to an appropriate
hospital . . . . [I]f such assisted outpatient refuses to take medications
as required by the court order, . . . such physician may consider such
refusal or failure when determining whether the assisted outpatient is
in need of an examination to determine whether . . . hospitalization is
necessary. Upon the request of such physician, the director . . . may
direct peace officers . . . or police officers . . . to take into custody
and transport any such person to the hospital . . . .
Id. See also discussion infra Part II.C (explaining the right to determine the
course of one’s own treatment).

O'CONNORFINALMACRO2-26.DOC

316

4/1/03 2:46 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Moreover, the law abridges the physician-patient privilege by
allowing treating psychiatrists to testify at AOT hearings.10
Additionally, studies suggest Kendra’s Law is not only
ineffective but also counterproductive.11
This note provides a critical analysis of Kendra’s Law and
suggests areas for careful scrutiny and possible reform. Part I
provides a brief history of involuntary treatment of the mentally
ill through the use of outpatient commitment. Next, it explains
the development of New York’s AOT law.12 Part II discusses
both the minimal protections Kendra’s Law provides and the
various infringements the law imposes on the rights of mentally
ill people. Specifically it discusses how Kendra’s Law erodes the
right to counsel, the right to refuse treatment and the right to
privileged, confidential treatment. Part III discusses the general
effectiveness of involuntary outpatient commitment and the
effectiveness of New York’s AOT law. Finally, this note
concludes that if Kendra’s Law is to survive past 2005, when the
sunset provision takes effect, the law’s impact on fundamental
rights as well as its effectiveness need to be considered prior to
its renewal.13
I. INVOLUNTARY MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
Involuntary outpatient commitment refers to the use of court
orders to compel mentally ill individuals to participate in
community treatment.14 Involuntary outpatient commitment takes

10

§ 9.60(e)(3). “The petition shall be accompanied by an affirmation or
affidavit of a physician, who shall not be the petitioner, and shall state . . .
[that] he or she is willing and able to testify at the hearing on the petition . . .
.” Id. See also discussion infra Part II.D (describing the physician-patient and
psychotherapist privileges).
11
See discussion infra Part III (examining the effectiveness of outpatient
commitment generally and Kendra’s Law in particular).
12
§ 9.60.
13
§ 9.60. Kendra’s Law expires in 2005 if the legislature fails to renew
it. Id.
14
Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a
Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401 (2000) (arguing
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one of three forms: (1) conditional release from inpatient
hospitalization; (2) outpatient treatment as a less restrictive
alternative to hospitalization; or (3) preventive commitment.15
With the passage of Kendra’s Law, New York began to utilize
the third type—preventive commitment. Although this method
presents more constitutional issues than the alternatives, Kendra’s
Law has survived equal protection and due process challenges in
the lower courts.16
that Kendra’s Law “impermissibly infringes upon an individual’s right to
liberty, privacy, and freedom from bodily harm” and that it fails to address
mentally ill individuals’ mental health needs). One criticism of outpatient
commitment laws is that rehospitalization is often the only sanction available
when patients refuse to comply with treatment. Ronald L. Wisor, Jr.,
Community Care, Competition, and Coercion: A Legal Perspective on
Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 165 (1993)
(arguing that current outpatient commitment statutes are ineffective in reducing
hospital readmissions); see also Jillane T. Hinds, Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment for the Chronically Mentally Ill, 69 NEB. L. REV. 346, 358
(1990) (discussing the development of and need for involuntary outpatient
commitment). The failure of the deinstutionalization movement, a public
policy initiative developed in the 1960s to transfer less severely mentally ill
individuals from state psychiatric hospitals to the community, led to the trend
of involuntary outpatient treatment. Id. Deinstitutionalization’s failure also led
to a phenomenon known as the “transinstitutionalization” of the mentally ill,
meaning that the majority of the mentally ill are now housed and treated in
jails, prisons, and homeless shelters as opposed to being treated by state
psychiatric hospitals or community mental health programs. Ilissa L. Watnik,
Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution
for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1186
(2001); see also Kolker, supra note 7 (discussing the revolving door syndrome
in New York City).
15
See Geraldine A. McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment: An Update, 14 MENT. & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 277
(1990) (providing an in-depth discussion on the three types of outpatient
commitment and the status of outpatient commitment as of 1990).
16
See In re Martin, 225 N.Y.L.J. 6, Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 8, 2001) (holding Kendra’s Law constitutional, as well as finding an
additional hearing is not required prior to arrest or hospitalization in order to
satisfy due process); In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)
(holding that Kendra’s Law does not violate the fundamental right to choose
the course of one’s own medical treatment under the due process and equal
protection clauses of state’s constitution); see also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing
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A. Outpatient Commitment

The state-imposed treatment of individuals with mental illness
is justified by the state’s police power to protect its citizens from
harm and the state’s parens patriae power to protect those who
cannot help themselves.17 Police power relates to a state’s duty to
protect its citizens’ health, safety and general welfare.18
Recognizing that some mentally ill individuals pose a danger to
themselves or others in society, states justify involuntary
inpatient commitment through their police powers.19 Parens
patriae power, however, is derived from the state’s paternalistic
responsibility to care and protect those that it deems unable to
care for themselves.20 The different rationales lead to different
standards for forced medication.21 With regard to the state’s
police power, the state has the authority to forcibly medicate
when an individual poses a danger to himself or others.22 The
state’s parens patriae power, on the other hand, justifies forceful
administration of medication for individuals that lack the capacity

how Kendra’s Law has withstood constitutional challenges in the lower courts
thus far); infra Part II (discussing how Kendra’s Law infringes on various
rights of those with mental illness).
17
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1187 (concluding that the state’s police
power and parens patriae power outweigh the patient’s liberty and autonomy
interests and arguing that Kendra’s Law does not violate substantive and
procedural due process). See also Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y.
1986) (discussing the state’s police and parens patriae powers and involuntary
treatment and ultimately concluding that involuntarily committed mentally ill
individuals have a fundamental right to refuse anti-psychotic medication under
the Due Process clause of the state constitution). Parens patriae literally means
“parent of the country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1996).
18
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1187.
19
See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
20
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1187.
21
Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 495-96.
22
Id. at 495. “Where the patient presents a danger to himself or other
members of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct
within the institution, the State may be warranted, in the exercise of its police
power, in administering antipsychotic medication over the patient’s objection.”
Id.
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to decide for themselves.23
Conditional release is a type of outpatient commitment that
requires an individual to follow the hospital’s treatment plan upon
discharge from involuntary civil commitment.24 Conditional
release is hospital-oriented and often without judicial
proceedings.25 When an individual’s condition improves and
hospitalization is no longer necessary, the hospital may place
conditions on the discharge prior to the release.26 Under
conditional release, the hospital or physician generally determines
the terms of the release.27 If the individual does not comply with
the terms of the release, the doctor decides whether

23

Id. at 496.
Therefore, the sine qua non for the state’s use of its parens patriae
power as justification for the forceful administration of mind-affecting
drugs is a determination that the individual to whom the drugs are to
be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself whether he
should take the drugs.

Id.
24

Hinds, supra note 14, at 356-58; McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15,
at 279. In some jurisdictions, such as Georgia, the court may require
conditional release as part of the initial involuntary commitment order. Id. at
279. The dynamics of conditional release vary from state to state. Id.
25
Hinds, supra note 14, at 358 (comparing the differences between
conditional release and other forms of outpatient commitment and finding that
the decision to place an individual on conditional release is solely the
discretion of the inpatient facility or treating physician). Generally, the
treatment facility or the treating physician also creates the terms of the release
and courts are notified after the fact. McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at
279.
26
McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279. “Typical conditions
include periodic reporting [follow-up care]; continuation of medication and
submission to testing; and restrictions on travel, consumption of liquor or
drugs, associations with others, and the incurrence of debts and other
obligations.” Id. The length of time on conditional release varies among the
states. Id.
27
Id.; Hinds, supra note 14, at 356. When the hospital or physician, as
opposed to the court, creates the plan, the hospital or physician can create an
individualized treatment plan geared towards the best interests of the patient,
for whom the hospital or physician may have previously provided help. Hinds,
supra note 14, at 356.
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rehospitalization is appropriate.28 Most states, including New
York, authorize conditional release.29
As a dispositional alternative, outpatient commitment allows a
court discretion to order outpatient commitment in lieu of
hospitalization after finding that the standard for involuntary
inpatient commitment is met.30 Most states authorize outpatient
28

McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15 (McKinney 2002). “A patient may
be conditionally released, rather than discharged, when in the opinion of staff
familiar with the patient’s case history, the clinical needs of such patient
warrant this more restrictive placement . . . .” Id. As of 1990, forty-three
states authorized conditional release. McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at
279 n.41; see also ALA. CODE § 22-52-57 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.795
(Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01 (West 2002); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5305 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a509 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5131 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.469 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-85 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 334-75 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 66-338 (Michie 2002); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 1705/15 (West 2002); IND. CODE § 12-26-14-7 (2002); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229.15(4) (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.181 (Banks-Baldwin
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:56(G) (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-B, § 3870 (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-806
(2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 4 (West 2002); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 235B.15 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-87 (2002); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 632.385 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-183 (2002);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1046 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 433A.380 (2002);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:49 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15(c)
(West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21 (Michie 2002); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 29.15 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-277(a)
(2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-30 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5122.20 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 7-101 (West 2002); OR.
REV. STAT §§ 426.130, 426.126 (2001); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304
(West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-22-210 (Law Co-op. 2002); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-6-202 (2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.061,
574.082, 574.086 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-637 (2002); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 8007 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-98 (Michie 2002);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.340 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 27-7-2
(2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.35 (West 2002). Some states refer to
conditional release as “convalescent status.” See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §
202A.181 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3870
(West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21 (Michie 2002).
30
McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279-80.
29
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treatment as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient
hospitalization.31 After a finding that the individual meets the
requirement for civil inpatient commitment, some courts have the
discretion to opt for outpatient treatment.32
Preventive commitment is a type of outpatient commitment
that does not require a finding of dangerousness in order to

31

See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.1 (2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.735,
47.30.755 (Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (West 2002);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-214(c) (Michie 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10107(6) (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498 (West 2002); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010(2) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(6)(b) (West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(k)
(Michie 2002); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-812 (West 2002); IND. CODE
§ 12-26-6-8 (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.14 (West 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2967 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.081 (Banks-Baldwin
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E) (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 330.1468 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 235B.09 (West 2002);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1038 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135C:45 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11 (Michie 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 25-03.1-21 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2002); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-405 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT § 426.130(1)
(2001); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4406 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-58(j) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. Codified
Laws § 27A-10-9 (Michie 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§
574.012, 574.036 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7617, 7618 (2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240
(West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(o) (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51-20(13)
(West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(j) (Michie 2002). New York
does not authorize this form of outpatient commitment. See N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney 2002). In Arizona, once the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that an individual meets the criteria for court-ordered
treatment, “the court shall order the patient to undergo one of the following:
1. Treatment in a program of outpatient treatment[;] 2. Treatment in a
program consisting of combined inpatient and outpatient treatment[; or] 3.
Inpatient treatment . . . .” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (West 2002).
Some states authorize the “least restrictive” court-ordered treatment, which is
included as a form of outpatient treatment as a dispositional alternative. See,
e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.012, 574.036 (2001);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(j) (Michie 2002).
32
McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279-80.
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commit involuntarily an individual to treatment.33 As of 1990,
only three states authorized preventive commitment.34 Preventive
commitment statutes mandate treatment for individuals who do
not meet the high standards for inpatient commitment but who
are likely to face inpatient commitment in the near future if they
do not receive immediate treatment.35 Preventive commitment is
an attempt to remedy the problem of “revolving door” patients,
i.e., patients who, after being released from a hospital,
subsequently stop taking medications, deteriorate and are

33

Mark Moran, Coercion or Caring?, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 17, 2000)
(debating whether outpatient commitment benefits the severely mentally ill or
whether it is a “cop-out” for a failed mental health system), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/hlsa0417.htm.
North
Carolina is considered a pioneer in outpatient preventive commitment because
it was the first state to enact an involuntary outpatient treatment statute in
1983. Wisor, Jr., supra note 14.
34
McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15; see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 373-90, 37-3-1 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-127 (1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-263 (1989). According to a more recent survey, the following
ten states allow outpatient commitment without a finding of dangerousness:
Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, Montana, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina and Texas. Moran, supra note 33.
35
§ 9.37. Preventive commitment statutes often apply a “grave disability”
standard, which is a major shift in focus from commitment laws that require a
standard of current dangerous behavior. M. SUSAN RIDGELY ET AL., RAND
ORG., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT TREATMENT:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES (2001)
(providing a comprehensive analysis of state outpatient commitment statutes),
at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1340/. A grave disability
standard requires only that an individual is dangerous because of an inability
to care adequately for himself. Id. at 2. Current dangerousness, which is
frequently the standard for inpatient hospitalization, requires a finding that an
individual is overtly dangerous to himself or others. Id. Under North
Carolina’s statute, for example, an individual is eligible for outpatient
commitment if, “[b]ased on the respondent’s psychiatric history, the
respondent is in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or
deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness . . . .” N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (1989). See also Nisha C. Wagle et al., Outpatient
Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENT. AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 179 (2002) (discussing the similarities and differences between the
New York and North Carolina statutes).
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rehospitalized.36 It is also a reflection of the state’s parens patriae
powers and the conflict between medical paternalism and
individual autonomy.37 Coerced medication compliance is the
most important factor in preventive commitment.38 Preventive
commitment, however, has been criticized as simply a “form of
judicial intimidation [because] [c]ompliance is achieved only if
the person fears rehospitalization or mistakenly believes that the
court’s order must be obeyed.”39 As one commentator noted,
“[p]reventive commitment is a backlash to the gains in mental
patient autonomy over the past two decades.”40 Another critic
noted that:
[T]he courts [now] have the power to decide the essential
details of many mentally ill people’s lives long after they
have left the hospital. A judge can now rule on . . . which
medications a patient must take to whether they spend
their days learning word processing or taking pottery
classes. Even such basic decisions as where to live and
work can now be controlled by the courts.41

36

Wisor, supra note 14, at 159-60 (discussing the “revolving door”
dilemma and appropriate community responses to stop it).
37
Id. at 168-69. One commentator has described medical paternalism as
“the caring parent who nurtures and protects a child without waiting for
permission.” Mark J. Hauser & Archie Brodsky, Paternalism in Mental
Health Facilities: Resolving Conflicts over Telephone Access, Mail, and Visits,
at http://www.psychiatry.com/advocacy/paternalism.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2002). Medical paternalism refers to the notion that doctors can make
decisions for their patients. Id.
38
Wisor, supra note 14, at 161, 169.
39
Id. at 171.
40
Id. at 166.
41
Wendy Davis, Insanity Pleas, CITY LIMITS, May 2000 (arguing that
Kendra’s Law and mental hygiene courts generally have significant power,
including the power to erode the rights of the mentally ill, especially the right
to refuse medication), http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/articleView.
cfm?articlenumber=326. Davis discusses the example of John Sharpe, who
has a psychotic disorder and history of numerous hospitalizations and, at the
time Davis wrote her article, was a patient at Kingsboro Psychiatric Hospital.
Id. Mr. Sharpe told the judge that he refused the medication because of the
severe side effects, such as twitching. Id. The judge authorized the forcible
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B. New York’s Response—Kendra’ s Law

New York’s support of outpatient commitment is a recent
development.42 Prior to the 1990s, New York was the only state
with a law that explicitly prohibited outpatient commitment.43
One purpose of New York’s shift was to close the loophole of
lack of services to the mentally ill due to the high standard of
dangerousness required for involuntary inpatient commitment.44
Without involuntary outpatient treatment, the only mandated
treatment available, inpatient hospitalization, required a finding
by two physicians that the individual was currently a danger to
himself or others, a difficult standard to meet.45 Unlike statutes
that utilize a grave disability standard, New York’s pilot project

administration of the medication anyway, and Mr. Sharpe was then injected
with Prolixin, an anti-psychotic that can cause muscle spasms, eye paralysis
and permanent neurological damage. Id.
42
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1191. New York does not authorize
outpatient commitment as an alternative if an individual meets the criteria for
civil inpatient commitment. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney
2002). Before Kendra’s Law, New York required a finding of immediate
danger of serious harm to oneself or others prior to initiating commitment
proceedings. Id. Involuntary inpatient hospitalization requires a finding that an
individual “has a mental illness for which immediate inpatient care and
treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in serious
harm to himself or herself or others . . . . The need for immediate
hospitalization shall be confirmed by a staff physician of the hospital prior to
admission.” Id. If the patient is to be retained involuntarily beyond seventytwo hours, the certificate of another examining physician concluding that the
patient is in need of involuntary care and treatment must be filed. Id. If a New
York court determines that an individual meets the civil inpatient commitment
criteria, the individual must be hospitalized. Id. See also McCafferty &
Dooley, supra note 15, at 279 n.70 (listing states which do authorize
outpatient treatment as an alternative to inpatient hospitalization).
43
See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 2409; Watnik, supra note 14, at
1191.
44
§ 9.37. Inpatient hospitalization is only appropriate when two
physicians find an individual is likely to commit serious harm to himself or
others if not committed. Id.
45
See discussion supra note 42 (explaining the requirements of
involuntary inpatient hospitalization).
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and Kendra’s Law employ the “likelihood of physical harm to
self or others” standard.46 This lower standard is easier to meet,
thus leading to a greater number of individuals eligible for
involuntary commitment.
1.

Origins of Kendra’s Law: The Bellevue Pilot Project

In 1994, New York enacted legislation that created an
outpatient commitment program at Bellevue Hospital in New
York City—the Bellevue Pilot Project.47 Only those who met nine
criteria were eligible for involuntary outpatient treatment under
the project, which was the precursor to Kendra’s Law:
(i) the patient is eighteen years of age or older; and (ii)
the patient is suffering from a mental illness; and (iii) the
patient is incapable of surviving safely in the community
without supervision, based on a clinical determination;
and (iv) the patient is hospitalized at [Bellevue] . . . ; and
(v) the patient has a history of lack of compliance with
treatment that has necessitated involuntary hospitalization
at least twice within the last eighteen months; and (vi) the

46

RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 33, 37-38.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.61 (repealed 1999). Opponents of New
York’s outpatient commitment statute argued that section 9.61 was a “political
maneuver intended to appease a frightened and frustrated public.” POLICY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., FINAL REPORT: RESEARCH STUDY OF THE NEW
YORK CITY INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT PILOT PROGRAM 16
(1998) [hereinafter PRA REPORT]. The Legislature enacted section 9.61 after
a decade-long effort to extend the state’s parens patriae power to include
“gravely disabled” mentally ill individuals living on the street. Id. The
majority of these individuals were more dangerous to themselves due to their
environmental circumstances, but occasionally they became a public nuisance
and received media attention. Id. For example, Larry Hogue was cited as a
prime example of the necessity for outpatient commitment. Id. Hogue was “a
homeless veteran who was both actively psychotic and a crack cocaine addict”
and who allegedly terrorized the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Id. Neither
police nor the mental health system were able to help him or the
neighborhood. Id. Hogue, ironically, would most likely not have been eligible
for services under the pilot project due to concerns regarding liability for his
dangerousness. Id.
47
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patient is, as a result of his or her mental illness, unlikely
to voluntarily participate in the recommended treatment
pursuant to the treatment plan; and (vii) in view of the
patient’s treatment history and current behavior, the
patient is in need of involuntary outpatient treatment in
order to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be
likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others . . .
; and (viii) it is likely that the patient will benefit from
involuntary outpatient treatment; and (ix) the involuntary
treatment program of such hospital is willing and able to
provide the involuntary outpatient treatment ordered.48
Interestingly, studies of the Bellevue Pilot Project showed that
mandatory treatment did not make a significant difference in a
patient’s recovery.49 Two groups of researchers studied the
project: Policy Research Associates (PRA) and Bellevue
Hospital.50 The PRA study assigned individuals randomly to
either the control group or the experimental court-ordered
group.51 Researchers interviewed subjects prior to discharge from
the hospital and in the community at one, five and eleven
months.52 The key findings of the PRA study are:
[1.] No statistically significant differences were found
between the experimental and control groups for acute or
state rehospitalizations in terms of the proportion
rehospitalized or the amount of days spent hospitalized in
the 11-month follow-up. [2.] For both the experimental
48

§ 9.61(c). The eligibility criteria did not focus on patients with a
documented history of violence, the supposed targets of the legislation. PRA
REPORT, supra note 47, at 47.
49
PRA REPORT, supra note 47. See also Michael A. Riccardi, Courts
Make Kendra’s Law Work, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 2001, at 1.
50
PRA REPORT, supra note 47; HOWARD TELSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE
BELLEVUE HOSPITAL CENTER OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT PILOT PROGRAM
(1999), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/MedicalResources.
51
See TELSON, supra note 50. Those in the control group received
outpatient treatment as part of their discharge plans. Id. at 12. The study
consisted of 78 patients under an AOT and 64 control patients. PRA REPORT,
supra note 47, at i.
52
PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at i.
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and control subjects, a statistically significantly smaller
proportion were rehospitalized during the 11 month
follow-up in OCP as compared to the year preceding the
target admission. [3.] Arrests during the follow-up period
revealed no violence against persons for either group and
relatively few subjects arrested overall, 16% for controls
and 18% for experimentals. There were no differences
between the control and experimental group on indicators
for any arrest, multiple arrests, number of arrests, or
most serious charge. [4.] The control and experimental
groups overall were not significantly different on any
quality of life or symptomatology outcome measures. [5.]
There were no significant differences in the number of
clients in the two groups who discontinued treatment—
27% for the experimental group and 26% for the control
group.53
Notably, the researchers found “[t]here is no indication that,
overall, the court order for outpatient commitment produces
better outcomes for clients of the community than enhanced
services alone. However, both groups appeared to profit from the
enhanced services . . . .”54
While New York’s legislature was still exploring the issue,
Kendra Webdale’s death occurred, spurring the state to expedite
the implementation of outpatient commitment throughout the state

53

PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at ii (references to Tables omitted). “For
the experimental subjects the proportion went from 87.1% to 51.4% and for
the controls from 80% to 41.6% with a hospitalization.” Id. at ii. Critics have
argued that the PRA study has its limitations as well. RIDGELY, supra note 35,
at 26. For example, providers were unclear as to who was under an AOT
order and therefore did not consistently enforce the orders. Id. Also, more
individuals under a court order also suffered from substance abuse as
compared to the control group (56% and 39% respectively). Id. Critics
additionally assert that the study suffers from small sample size. Id. PRA
acknowledges that the pilot project “never reached the fully executed,
clinicians-working-with-law-enforcement-officers,
preventive
detention
version intended by the legislature.” PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at 46.
54
PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at ii.
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in only eight months.55 In enacting Kendra’s Law, the legislature
found:
there are mentally ill persons who are capable of living in
the community with the help of family, friends, and
mental health professionals, but who, without routine care
and treatment, may relapse and become violent or
suicidal, or require hospitalization . . . . The legislature
further finds that some mentally ill persons, because of
their illness, have great difficulty taking responsibility for
their own care, and often reject the outpatient treatment
offered them on a voluntary basis.56
This legislative finding particularly reflects the state’s assertion
of its paternalistic parens patriae power.57
Prior to Kendra’s Law, the real problem was lack of available
treatment for individuals with mental illness. For example,
55

Jones, supra note 4. In addition to Kendra’s death in January of 1999,
other similar incidents occurred that same year. See Nisha C. Wagle et al.,
Outpatient Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENT. AND PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 179 (2002). In April 1999 two incidents of violence by
men with mental illness occurred: a man swung a sword on the Long Island
Rail Road and a man pushed another man into an oncoming subway train. Id.
at 179. Tragically, subway pushing is not a new phenomenon since similar
incidents occurred in prior years. Kirsten Danis, Horror on the Tracks:
Flashback to Terror of Days Gone By, N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at 4. In
February of 1996 a teen with mental illness pushed a young woman to her
death from a train. See id. In January of 1995, an escaped mental patient
pushed an elderly woman in front of a train, causing her death. Id. New York
adopted Kendra’s Law on August 9, 1999. S. 5762-A, 222d Sess. (N.Y.
1999). Kendra’s Law passed both houses of the legislature by an
overwhelming majority: 49 to 2 in the Senate and 142 to 4 in the Assembly.
Jonathan Stanley, Getting Care to Those Most in Need (Jan. 2000) (describing
the large support for Kendra’s Law by both houses), at http://www.naswnyc.
org/mhs4.html.
56
1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2. “Effective mechanisms for accomplishing
these ends include[] the establishment of assisted outpatient treatment . . ..”
Id. “The legislature further finds that if such court-ordered treatment is to
achieve its goals, it must be linked to a system of comprehensive care . . . .”
Id.
57
See supra Part I.A (discussing the state’s parens patriae power in
outpatient commitment).
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Andrew Goldstein, the man who pushed Kendra Webdale in front
of the train, ironically, would not likely have been subject to an
AOT order, which is limited to individuals who are noncompliant
with treatment.58 In fact, Mr. Goldstein had sought commitment
or supervised living no fewer than thirteen times.59 Each time, he
was discharged and denied help due to a lack of funding.60 In
reality, “the contemporary problem [in mental health treatment]
is obtaining treatment, not refusing its imposition.”61
The Legislature enacted Kendra’s Law, disregarding the
significant research findings from the Bellevue Pilot Project
suggesting that court orders are ineffective.62 Additionally,
research shows that only a small number of people with severe
and persistent mental illness are at risk of becoming violent.63
Kendra’s Law is, therefore, a hasty enactment that is
unresponsive to the real problem of providing community
treatment to individuals with mental illness.
2.

Kendra’s Law in a Nutshell

Kendra’s Law authorizes an AOT program,64 which provides
case management services or assertive community treatment to an
individual with mental illness and may include other services
ordered by the court.65 Case management is a method of
58

Moran, supra note 33; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60
(McKinney 2002).
59
Gutterman, supra note 14, at 2439.
60
Id.
61
Paul F. Stavis, The George Mason University First Annual Forum on
Mental Illness and the Law, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 7 (Winter
2000) (describing the history of mental health treatment and changes in law
and policies).
62
Moran, supra note 33; RIDGELY, supra note 35. See supra text
accompanying notes 49-54 (discussing the findings of the researchers who
studied the Bellevue Pilot Project).
63
American Psychiatric Association, Fact Sheet: Violence and Mental
Illness (1998), available at http://www.psych.org/public_info/violence.pdf.
64
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002).
65
Moran, supra note 33. Other services that the court may include in an
AOT order are:

O'CONNORFINALMACRO2-26.DOC

330

4/1/03 2:46 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

coordinating treatment and care in the community. It entails a
case manager “develop[ing] care plans, arrang[ing] for services
to be provided, monitor[ing] the care provided, and maintain[ing]
contact with the individual.”66 Aimed at keeping individuals in
contact with a variety of services, assertive community treatment
(“ACT”) is a model of treatment that uses a team approach to
provide comprehensive, community-based psychiatric treatment,
rehabilitation, and support.67
In order to obtain an AOT order in New York, an individual
authorized by the statute to file a petition must state the facts that
support the belief that a patient meets all of the criteria.68

medication; periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance
with prescribed medications; individual or group therapy; day or
partial day programming activities; educational and vocational
training or activities; alcohol or substance abuse treatment and
counseling and periodic tests for the presence of alcohol or illegal
drugs for a person with a history of alcohol or substance abuse;
supervision of living arrangements; and any other services . . . to
assist the person in living and functioning in the community, or to
attempt to prevent a relapse or deterioration that may reasonably be
predicted to result in suicide or the need for hospitalization.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(a)(1) (McKinney 2002).
66
RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 29.
67
Id. at 28. An ACT team typically includes psychiatrists, nurses, social
workers, peer advocates, and other professionals working together. Id.
68
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e) (McKinney 2002). Under Kendra’s
Law, a petition may be initiated by:
(i) any person eighteen years of age or older with whom the subject
of the petition resides; or (ii) the parent, spouse, sibling eighteen
years of age or older, or child eighteen years of age or older of the
subject of the petition; or (iii) the director of a hospital in which the
subject of the petition is hospitalized; or (iv) the director of any
public or charitable organization, agency or home providing mental
health services to the subject of the petition in whose institution the
subject of the petition resides; or (v) a qualified psychiatrist who is
either supervising the treatment of or treating the subject of the
petition for a mental illness; or (vi) the director of community
services, or his or her designee, or the social services official, as
defined in the social services law, of the city or county in which the
subject of the petition is present or reasonably believed to be present;
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Whereas the Bellevue Pilot Project established nine criteria for
determining the eligibility of a patient,69 under Kendra’s Law a
patient qualifies for an AOT order if seven criteria are met:70
(1)[T]he patient is eighteen years of age or older; (2) the
patient is suffering from a mental illness; (3) the patient is
unlikely to survive safely in the community without
supervision, based on a clinical determination; (4) the
patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment
for mental illness that has: (i) at least twice within the last
thirty-six months been a significant factor in necessitating
hospitalization . . . or receipt of services in a . . . mental
health unit of a correctional facility . . . or; (ii) resulted in
one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self
or others or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical
harm to self or others within the last forty-eight
months . . . ; and (5) the patient is, as a result of his or
her mental illness, unlikely to voluntarily participate in
the recommended treatment; and (6) the patient is in need
of assisted outpatient treatment in order to prevent a
relapse or deterioration which would be likely to result in
serious harm to the patient or others; and (7) it is likely
that the patient will benefit from assisted outpatient
treatment.71
A physician’s affirmation or affidavit must accompany the
or (vii) a parole officer or probation officer assigned to supervise the
subject of the petition.
§ 9.60(e)(1). “A petition . . . may be filed in the supreme or county court in
the county in which the subject . . . is present.” § 9.60(e)(1). In addition to
each criterion, the petition must state the facts which support the petitioner’s
belief that the subject meets each criterion and the subject is present within the
county. § 9.60(e)(2).
69
See supra text accompanying note 48 (listing the Bellevue Pilot Project
criteria).
70
§ 9.60(c).
71
Id. Some of these eligibility requirements, such as (3) and (5), require
a physician to make predictions, which is not possible in psychiatry or
psychology. TELSON, supra note 50, at 15. “Many factors influence a patient’s
clinical course in the community.” Id. at 22.
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petition.72 At the hearing, the examining physician must then
testify and provide the court with a proposed written treatment
plan.73 A court may then order assisted outpatient treatment only
if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a patient
meets the criteria, but it must dismiss the petition if any one of
the criteria is not met.74
Once ordered, a patient must accept the treatment.75 Failure
to comply with an AOT order may lead to involuntary hospital
admission for up to seventy-two hours for observation, care and
treatment.76 Efforts must first be made to solicit compliance,
though.77 And, involuntary retention beyond seventy-two hours is

72

§ 9.60(e)(3). If the petitioner is the treating physician, the affirmation
must be from a different physician. Id. “The petition shall be accompanied by
an affirmation or affidavit of a physician, who shall not be the petitioner . . .
.” Id.
73
§ 9.60(h)(2). “The court shall not order assisted outpatient treatment
unless an examining physician . . . testifies in person at the hearing.” Id. “The
court shall not order assisted outpatient treatment unless an examining
physician . . . develops and provides to the court a proposed written treatment
plan.” § 9.60(i)(1).
74
§ 9.60(j). “If after hearing all relevant evidence, the court finds that the
subject of the petition does not meet the criteria for assisted outpatient
treatment, the court shall dismiss the petition.” § 9.60(j)(1). If the court “finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the petition meets the
criteria . . . , and there is no appropriate and feasible less restrictive
alternative,” the court shall authorize AOT. § 9.60(j)(2); see also infra Part
I.B.4 and accompanying notes (discussing the court’s authority to dismiss the
petition or order alternatives).
75
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1199.
76
§ 9.60(n):
Where in the clinical judgment of a physician, the patient has failed
or has refused to comply with the treatment ordered by the court, and
in the physician’s clinical judgment, efforts were made to solicit
compliance, and, in the clinical judgment of such physician, such
patient may be in need of involuntary admission to a hospital . . . , or
for whom immediate observation, care and treatment may be
necessary . . . such physician may request . . . the removal of such
patient to an appropriate hospital . . . .
Id.
77
Id.
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permissible only when the individual meets the grounds for
involuntary civil commitment.78
Kendra’s Law takes away some of the procedural safeguards
and protection of rights that were in place under the Bellevue
Pilot Project.79 These differences effectively increase the number
of individuals eligible for AOT.80 Additionally, under the pilot
project, the proposed written treatment plan was part of the
application.81 Kendra’s Law requires only that the treatment plan
be submitted before the court can order AOT, which means that
the individual who is the subject of the petition and his lawyer
may not learn about the plan before the hearing.82 This change
78

§ 9.60(n). Involuntary civil commitment requires a finding by two
physicians that a person “has a mental illness for which immediate inpatient
care and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in
serious harm to himself or herself or others.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
9.37 (McKinney 2002).
79
Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.61 (repealed 1999) with §
9.60. One of the differences is in the fourth criteria. Compare § 9.61 with §
9.60. The pilot project required that a subject be currently hospitalized; under
Kendra’s Law, the subject may now be in the community. Compare § 9.61
with § 9.60. The third criteria also changed. Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60. The
pilot project required a finding that the “patient is incapable of surviving
safely in the community”; Kendra’s Law lowered the standard to a finding of
“unlikely to survive safely in the community.” Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60.
Additionally, the hospitalization “lookback period,” the length of time that the
court may consider prior acts of noncompliance, increased. Compare § 9.61
with § 9.60. Under the pilot project, the lookback period was only eighteen
months; Kendra’s Law extends the period to thirty-six. Compare § 9.61 with §
9.60. Also Kendra’s Law offers an alternative avenue—not available under the
pilot project—for a finding of lack of compliance if the subject does not meet
the hospitalization requirement: violent behavior within the last forty-eight
months. Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60. Lastly, under the pilot project, only the
director of a hospital could petition for an AOT order, but Kendra’s Law
authorizes petitions from a number of different individuals. Compare § 9.61
with § 9.60; see also Kristina M. Campbell, Note, Blurring the Lines of the
Danger Zone: The Impact of Kendra’s Law on the Rights of the Nonviolent
Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173 (2002)
(discussing the differences between sections 9.60 and 9.61).
80
Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60; see also Campbell, supra note 79.
81
§ 9.61(d)(2)(iii).
82
§ 9.60(i ).
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significantly limits the ability of the individual to contest any
aspects of the treatment plan. Furthermore, Kendra’s Law
narrows the time frame for a hearing from five days to three.83
These changes seriously limit a respondent’s ability to challenge
an AOT petition, thereby lessening substantive due process
protections.
3.

Constitutional Challenges to Kendra’s Law

Thus far, Kendra’s Law has withstood constitutional
challenges in the lower state courts.84 The first case to challenge
the constitutionality of the law was In re Urcuyo, in which the
respondents argued that Kendra’s Law violated both the Due
Process Clause of the New York Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the New York and United States
constitutions.85 Relying on the fact that patients have the capacity
to participate actively in the treatment plan, the court held that
the law did not violate a patient’s fundamental constitutional due
process right to choose the course of his treatment.86 Specifically,
the court noted that, under Kendra’s Law, “there is no forcible

83

Compare § 9.61(f)(1) with § 9.60(h).
See In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re
Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001).
85
714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). Outpatient mental health
treatment providers sought declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of
Kendra’s Law. Id. The court rejected arguments that Kendra’s Law violates an
individual’s due process rights without a finding that an individual lacks the
capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision. Id. The court also rejected the
argument that it violates equal protection because it treats AOT subjects
differently from individuals subject to guardianship proceedings and
involuntary inpatients. Id.
86
Id. The court drew on its own experience in presiding over Kendra’s
Law hearings in Brooklyn, stating specifically that individuals facing an AOT
order usually have the capacity to make treatment decisions. Id. The court
noted “[t]he practical result of requiring a lack of capacity component to be
added to the statutory scheme would be to eliminate the option of an Assisted
Outpatient Treatment order for many patients.” Id. at 869. See also discussion
infra Part II.C (discussing the right to determine one’s own course of
treatment).
84
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administration of medication and the patient will suffer no
punitive measures for failing to comply.”87 The court further
explained that failure to comply only leads to heightened scrutiny
by the physician as to whether or not the patient may be in need
of inpatient hospitalization.88 The petitions in In re Urcuyo were
ultimately withdrawn, making it impossible to appeal and obtain
a higher court ruling on the law.89
In January 2001, In re Martin again challenged the
constitutionality of Kendra’s Law.90 In In re Martin, respondents
argued that due process and equal protection require a finding of
incapacity before forcing an individual to undergo treatment.91
The court again concluded that Kendra’s Law was constitutional,
finding that “the patient is invited to participate in the
formulation of his treatment plan” and that “no drugs or
treatment will be forced upon him if he fails to comply with the
treatment plan.”92 Similar to the court in In re Urcuyo, the court
87

In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
Id. at 869-70.
89
In re Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8,
2001); Fred Cohen, Assisted Outpatient Treatment: Review of New York Case
Law—And Beyond, 3 CORRECTIONAL MENT. HEALTH REP. 1, (July/Aug.
2001) (arguing that the expectation is that Martin petition, unlike the Urcuyo
petition, will remain viable and appealable so long as the petitions are not
withdrawn), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/generalresources/article
48.htm.
90
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001). The
director of a psychiatric hospital sought an AOT order against respondent
patient, who opposed it on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Id. The
court rejected the respondent’s argument that due process and equal protection
require a finding of incapacity before an AOT petition may be granted. Id.
The court also denied respondent’s argument that notice and a hearing should
be required prior to being arrested and detained for alleged failure to comply.
Id. The court was deferential to the legislature: “[I]t is presumed that the
Legislature has investigated and found facts necessary to support the
legislation.” Id. In its conclusion, the court stated, “Kendra’s Law is a
carefully crafted, well drawn and narrowly tailored enactment specifically
directed toward the solution of serious problems faced by society and mentally
ill persons.” Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. The court also concluded that the finding that the individual is
88
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in In re Martin reasoned that failure to comply only leads to
heightened scrutiny from a physician regarding the need for
hospitalization and that re-confinement is far from automatic.93
The court also held that Kendra’s Law complied with due process
requirements even though it does not require a pre-revocation
hearing prior to arrest or hospitalization because the existence of
a potential emergency supports the important governmental
interest of protecting the individual and society.94
The courts are correct that, on its face, the statute requires
participation and proscribes forcibly medicating an individual.95
In practice, however, the application of Kendra’s Law may be
less protective of an individual’s interests.96 Neither the courts
nor the legislature have defined the meaning and level of
participation sufficient to protect due process.97
4. Judicial Restraint
Kendra’s Law has also been challenged on non-constitutional
unlikely to participate voluntarily in treatment is “analogous to the finding of
lack of capacity necessary for the forcible administration of medication.” Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. A review of due process challenges in other states that allow
revocation of outpatient commitment status and hospitalization of an individual
suggests that respondents are unlikely to win on this issue if appealed. See,
e.g., In re K.B., 562 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
statutory procedures that do not include a revocation hearing did not violate
due process because of the due process protections in the original commitment
proceeding); In re True, 645 P.2d 891 (Idaho 1982) (holding that due process
requires prompt written notice and a revocation hearing as soon as reasonably
possible following the patient’s rehospitalization). But see State v. Bryant, 871
P.2d 129, 132 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing for a revocation hearing prior to
hospitalization but finding that due process does not require the state to prove
that the person remains mentally ill in order to revoke outpatient
commitment).
95
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002).
96
See discussion infra Part II.C (examining how Kendra’s Law erodes the
right to determine the course of own’s treatment which includes the right to
refuse medication).
97
See In re Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31; In re Urcuyo, 714
N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); § 9.60.
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grounds. For example, Kendra’s Law severely restricts judicial
discretion when reviewing petitions.98 Specifically, a court “may
not order treatment that has not been recommended by the
examining physician and included in the written treatment
plan.”99 This judicial restraint limits the judge’s inquiry solely to
the question of whether an individual meets all of the criteria for
AOT.100
In a recent decision, the Appellate Division, First
Department, found that, when deciding whether to grant an AOT
petition, a court does not have the authority to decide if a patient
should be released from a hospital.101 The First Department
reasoned that the hospital must already have considered releasing
the patient and have concluded that AOT is a viable alternative to
hospitalization if it is seeking an AOT order.102 The court clearly
stated that a patient may not be hospitalized simply because an
AOT petition was denied.103
Another court found it had no choice but to approve a
“woefully inadequate” treatment plan for an individual the court

98

§ 9.60(j). Under Kendra’s Law, a court must dismiss the petition if all
of the criteria are not met. Id. A court, however, is not required to order AOT
even if all of the criteria are satisfied. Id.
99
§ 9.60(j)(2).
100
Id.
101
In re Manhattan Psychiatric Ctr., 728 N.Y.S.2d 37 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001). The psychiatric hospital petitioned for an AOT order against
respondent in March 2000, but the court held the order “in abeyance subject to
independent psychiatrist concurring in release.” Id. Counsel for the hospital
subsequently argued that it may have no legal means to retain the patient until
the independent examination. Id. The Appellate Division concurred with the
hospital’s counsel that “while it is within the discretion of the hospital director
to determine whether to apply for an order, it is for the court to determine
whether the director’s petition meets the statutory prerequisites . . . .” Id. The
hospital has already decided that release is appropriate, and “that decision is
not at issue in the AOT proceeding.” Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. Specifically, the court stated that “[f]or a person residing in the
community, the alternative to dismissal of a petition because the criteria for
AOT are not met is not admission to a hospital . . . .” Id.
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felt should not be released under any circumstances.104 The court
concluded that it does not appear from the statute, and in light of
the Appellate Division decision, that “the court can scrutinize the
plan and require improvements in it. Thus the court must either
accept or reject this plan.”105 Thus, Kendra’s Law effectively
shuts down judicial review regarding the wisdom or propriety of
AOT petitions.
Although courts may not agree with the strict requirements,
the Legislature may have desired to keep power out of the
courts.106 One possible reason for the lack of discretion is that the
Legislature may believe that doctors and hospitals are in a better
position to decide when to release a patient and when he is in
need of AOT. Lack of discretion, furthermore, protects an
individual from arbitrary decisions regarding the need for an
AOT order. The legislature, however, should consider allowing
judges some discretion, or at least allowing judges to suggest
improvements in the treatment plan, as an alternative.

104

In re Endress, 732 N.Y.S.2d 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). Barry H. had
a long history of numerous psychiatric hospitalizations and criminal justice
contacts due to his schizophrenia. Id. The proposed treatment plan included
living in a rooming house, supervision during the day, medication and
supervised employment. Id. Mr. H. explicitly told the court that he was
unwilling to comply with any long-term outpatient treatment. Id. At the
hearing, hospital doctors expressed a concern that he was still a danger to
himself or others. Id. The court did not want to discharge him from the
hospital but felt it had no alternative. Id.; see also Tom Perrotta, Judge
Frustrated by Flaws in Kendra’s Law, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 2001, at 1.
105
In re Endress, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 554. Another Judge, Norman C. Ryp,
Supreme Court, New York County, who presided over the first jury trial
appeal, has also spoken out about the lack of judicial discretion under
Kendra’s Law. Norman C. Ryp, Letter to the Editor, Kendra’s Law Needs
Review, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 2001, at 2 (calling for legislative review and
evaluation).
106
During the pilot project, individuals lodged complaints regarding the
role of judges. TELSON, supra note 50, at 18. Specifically, complaints arose
when judges limited testimony that doctors or patients wanted to introduce,
relying instead on the physician’s affidavit, or when judges failed to review
the entire treatment plan. Id.
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II. PROTECTION AND INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS
Although the Legislature specifically found that Kendra’s
Law was “compassionate, not punitive, [and] will restore
patients’ dignity,” certain aspects of the law do not respect a
patient’s rights to due process, autonomy, liberty and privacy.107
Specifically, Kendra’s Law infringes on the necessary right to
counsel, the fundamental right to refuse treatment and privileges
necessary for confidential treatment.
A. Protection of Due Process
Kendra’s Law has a high standard for eligibility.108 One of the
first reported cases, In re Sullivan, found that the “specificity in
pleading required under Kendra’s Law is not to be taken
lightly.”109 In fact, the court held that specificity was necessary to
protect a respondent’s due process rights, enable a respondent to
prepare a defense and permit the court to make an informed
decision regarding the need for AOT.110 The court also found the
physician’s supplemental affirmation insufficient because it
“neither state[d] that the allegations [were] based upon the
107

1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002); see also In re
Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001)
(discussing procedural due process protections provided for in Kendra’s Law).
109
710 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (2000).
110
Id. In this case, the physician submitted an affidavit that made
conclusory statements rather than citing specific facts. Id. The doctor stated in
his affirmation, “without any supporting documentation or specification, that
the respondent ‘has a long history of noncompliance with aftercare followup
[sic] and medications which has led to physically violent behavior resulting in
hospitalizations and criminal incarcerations.’” Id. at 856-57. He further states
that respondent “has a ‘previous history of homelessness that has led to
incarcerations and hospitalizations for dangerous behavior.’” Id. at 857. Then
he stated that respondent “has a history of lack of compliance with treatment
that has resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self or
others . . . .” Id. The court concluded that the language of the doctor’s
statements suggested that he tailored his statements to satisfy the statutory
language. Id.
108
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personal knowledge of [the doctor] nor identifie[d] the source of
such information.”111 Heightened specificity ensures procedural
due process, which in turn ensures that only individuals
appropriate for AOT will be correctly found eligible.112 One court
expressed concern, however, that judges, “motivated more by
protecting the public rather than compelling patients to get
needed treatment[,] may decide to err on the side of caution.”113
B. Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is a fundamental protection against the
risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.114 Kendra’s Law
safeguards this right by providing for representation by Mental
Hygiene Legal Services (“MHLS”), lawyers who represent
respondent outpatients at all stages of a proceeding.115 The law,
however, does not specify when the proceedings begin and, thus,
when the right to counsel attaches.116 MHLS has argued that the
111

Id. at 857.
Id.
113
Yael Schacher, Experts Disagree Over the Success of Kendra’s Law,
N.Y.L.J., June 30, 2000, at 1 (quoting Justice DiBlasi, Westchester County
Supreme Court).
114
Watnik, supra note 14. See also Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Services of
Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding a right to counsel for
parents whose rights are subject to termination in certain circumstances); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a right to counsel in juvenile delinquent
proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (finding a right to
counsel for an involuntarily committed inpatient at a hearing where the state
wants to administer antipsychotic medication against the individual’s wishes);
People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256 (1966) (finding a right to
counsel for individuals in involuntary commitment proceedings). “[T]here is a
right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may
lose his personal freedom.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20. See also Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (outlining three elements to be balanced when
deciding what due process requires).
115
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2002); see also N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.03(c) (McKinney 2002) (describing the functions of
MHLS with respect to AOT).
116
§ 9.60(g). “The subject of the petition shall have the right to be
represented by [MHLS], or other counsel . . . at all stages of a proceeding
112
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right to counsel begins when the individual is being examined.117
If the right attaches at the time of the examination, counsel could
ensure ‘participation’ in the treatment plan.118 Attaching the right
prior to the filing of the petition, though, is more costly and
could overwhelm MHLS.119 The courts or the legislature should
clarify when the right to counsel attaches.
While providing for legal representation may give the
appearance that Kendra’s Law protects procedural due process
rights, the right to counsel under Kendra’s Law is less
meaningful given some other aspects of the law.120 For example,
Kendra’s Law requires a court hearing within three days after the
petition is filed.121 This brief period provides insufficient time for
MHLS to prepare a case or even meet the client,122 especially
considering that MHLS often does not receive the petition
containing the doctor’s findings until the day after filing.123 As a
result, MHLS attorneys often do not have the opportunity to see
their clients prior to their hearings.124 Additionally, the law
allows for the treatment plan to be submitted at the time of the

commenced under this section.” Id.; see also D.J. Jaffe, Report on the New
York City Bar’s Forum on Kendra’s Law, at http://www.psychlaws.org/
StateActivity/NewYork/NYCBarForum.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).
117
Jaffe, supra note 116.
118
Id.
119
See Watnik, supra note 14, at 1209. Critics “expressed concern that
MHLS is underfunded and is often unable to provide attorneys.” Id. “[T]he
[legal] system could become overburdened as the demand for lawyers
increases.” Id. at 1218. Wisconsin provides legal counsel once the petition is
filed. WIS. ST. ANN. § 51.20(3) (West 2002) (assigning legal counsel at the
time of the filing of the petition).
120
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2002).
121
§ 9.60(h). The requirement that the hearing be held three days after
the filing of the petition is, on its face, insufficient for any attorney to
adequately defend a client. The issue is beyond the scope of this note.
122
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1209.
123
Jaffe, supra note 116.
124
Michael A. Riccardi, Courts Make Kendra’s Law Work, N.Y.L.J.,
May 7, 2001, at 1. Judges, however, have been receptive to granting
extensions. Jaffe, supra note 116.
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hearing.125 This does not provide sufficient time for an attorney to
rebut the plan.126 Also, the law does not require that the
defending attorney be notified when a warrant has been issued for
a client’s alleged failure to comply.127 Attorneys with MHLS
have thus requested that the court include on the AOT order
mandatory notification when allegations of noncompliance spark
the issuance of a warrant.128 Some lower courts have added
attorney notification provisos to AOT orders, but other judges
will not add the requirement since the law does not require it.129
Patients’ lawyers should be notified so they can intervene and
prepare for a hearing. There would be little detriment to the state
to include these safeguards in the law. The lack of these
safeguards in the law makes Kendra’s Law defective in fully
protecting the right of the mentally ill to effective representation.
C. Right to Determine the Course of One’s Own Treatment
New York courts have long recognized that every individual
“of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body” and, therefore, to determine
the course of his own medical treatment.130 Kendra’s Law
125

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i) (McKinney 2002).
Watnik, supra note 14, at 1210.
127
§ 9.60.
128
Riccardi, supra note 124.
129
Id. at 1.
130
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (finding a trend in law
and psychiatry to give mentally ill individuals an increasing amount of control
over their treatment decisions).
In our system of a free government, where notions of individual
autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must
have the final say in respect to decisions regarding his medical
treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible protection is
accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with
the furtherance of his own desires.
Id. at 341; See also In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (recognizing the
right to choose one’s own medical treatment even if the treatment is necessary
to preserve one’s life); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
126
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infringes upon this right due to the consequences of failure to
comply with an AOT order and by coercing a mentally ill
individual to comply with treatment.131 Although the law clearly
states that “[f]ailure to comply with an order of assisted
outpatient treatment shall not be grounds for involuntary civil
commitment or a finding of contempt of court,”132 Kendra’s Law
authorizes physicians to “direct the removal of such
[noncompliant] patient[s] to an appropriate hospital for
examination to determine” whether hospitalization is necessary.133
Furthermore, the law allows the physician to direct police
officers to “take into custody and transport” the noncompliant
patient.134 These consequences severely impinge upon an
individual’s right to freely choose the course of his treatment. An
individual has little choice if the only options are to follow the
treatment plan or face arrest and hospitalization for failure to
comply.135 Given that “[t]he right to refuse treatment is perhaps
the ultimate expression of mental patient autonomy,” this right
(holding that the state must have a compelling interest to justify the deprivation
of a mentally ill person’s liberty interest).
131
See § 9.60(n). Failure to comply with an AOT order may lead to
arrest, hospitalization, or both. Id. Psychiatrists recognize that noncompliance
is a “complex phenomenon, which may have many causes” with many factors
to consider. TELSON, supra note 50, at 11. For example, patients frequently
rejected supported housing because they objected to structure, curfews, and
other requirements. Id. at 17. Additionally, noncompliance is a clinical
judgment—some physicians may find noncompliance only if a patient refuses
all services; other physicians may deem noncompliance to mean a refusal of
some services; and others may find noncompliance for failure to attend a
single treatment session. Id. at 14. Additionally, New York’s Mental Hygiene
Law requires that an individual with mental illness “receive care and treatment
that is suited to his needs and skillfully, safely, and humanely administered
with full respect for his dignity and personal integrity.” § 33.03 (emphasis
added).
132
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 2002).
133
Id.
134
§ 9.60(n).
135
Moran, supra note 33. “In theory, if a person doesn’t comply with the
judge’s ruling, that patient can be sent to the inpatient ward.” Id. (quoting
Harvey Bluestone, M.D., director of the Dept. of Psychiatry at BronxLebanon Hospital Center in New York).
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should be better protected.136
One aspect of the right to refuse treatment, the right to refuse
medication, is particularly controversial.137 The right to refuse
medication is well-established in New York courts.138 In Rivers v.
Katz, the New York Court of Appeals held that the state can
administer medications over a patient’s objections only where the
patient presents a danger to himself or others or where the
individual lacks the capacity to decide for himself.139 The court
found “the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution (art. I, § 6) affords involuntarily committed mental
patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic
medication.”140 Under Rivers, the court must conduct an
individual assessment of an individual’s incompetency or
dangerousness before allowing forced medication.141 The Rivers
court found that “[t]he fact that a mental patient may disagree
136

Wisor, supra note 14, at 162.
See Campbell, supra note 79 (arguing that Kendra’s Law is overbroad
and unconstitutional, particularly with respect to the right to refuse treatment).
138
495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
139
Id. at 343-44. Rivers, and others similarly situated, were involuntarily
committed and refused medication. Id. Following administrative review
procedures, their objections were overruled and they were then medicated. Id.
140
Id. at 492. Traditional antipsychotic medications, such as Thorazine,
Mellaril, Prolixin, Stelazine, and Haldol, commonly cause dry mouth, blurred
vision, constipation, impotence, weight gain and severe neurological adverse
effects, such as parkinsonism (muscle stiffness and rigidity) and tardive
dyskinesia (“abnormal, involuntary, irregular” muscle movements). HAROLD
I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY (8th ed. 1998).
Dry mouth is a “troubling symptom” for individuals and often leads to
discontinuation of medications. Id. at 1030. Newer anti-psychotic medications,
such as Risperdal and Zyprexa, do not cause the debilitating neurologic
effects, but still cause problematic adverse effects, such as drowsiness,
dizziness, weight gain, constipation, erectile dysfunction and nausea. Id. at
1075-77. For a thorough discussion of antipsychotic medications and the right
of mentally ill patients to refuse these medications, see William M. Brooks,
Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection for
Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937 (1998) (providing
an in-depth discussion of effects of psychotropic medication as well as the
right to refuse).
141
495 N.E.2d 337, 344.
137
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with the psychiatrist’s judgment about the benefit of medication
outweighing the cost does not make the patient’s decision
incompetent.”142 The court understood that “mental illness often
strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas
unimpaired, and consequently, that many mentally ill persons
retain the capacity to function in a competent manner.”143 A
recent study supports this finding and the holding in Rivers.144
It should be noted that, when interpreting the right to refuse
treatment, courts generally treat mentally ill individuals
differently than medically ill individuals.145 The differential
approach and response is based on the assumption that mental
illness impairs an individual’s decision-making capacity and thus
prevents a mentally ill individual from meeting the requirements

142

Id. at 342 (citation omitted). “For many, a medication refusal is not a
rejection of all treatment, but a protest against the current dosage or side
effects . . . .” Wisor, supra note 14, at 172.
143
Id. at 342.
144
Id.
145
William M. Brooks, A Comparison of a Mentally Ill Individual’s Right
to Refuse Medication under the United States and the New York State
Constitutions, 8 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that mentally ill individuals
should have the same right to refuse medication as healthy citizens and
advocating the Rivers approach, which requires a finding of incompetence
before administering psychotropic drugs against an individual’s wishes). In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as
a constitutional right. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right to privacy has been
extended to include the right to refuse medical treatment. In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (finding a right to
refuse treatment for comatose patient). The Supreme Court concluded in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health that a constitutionally protected
interest exists in the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 497 U.S. 261
(1990). As to mental health treatment, the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Harper recognized a “significant” liberty interest in the right to refuse
antipsychotic medication under the Fourteenth Amendment. 494 U.S. 210
(1990). Nevertheless, the court held that treatment with antipsychotic
medication of a mentally ill prisoner against his will did not violate substantive
due process when the prisoner was found to be dangerous to himself or others
and treatment was in prisoner’s medical interest. Id. The broader impact of
Harper is unclear because it occurred in the context of a prison where the
state’s interest may be greater. Brooks, supra, at 22-23.
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of informed consent.146 A recent study shows, however, that
mentally ill individuals are not always incompetent to make
rational treatment decisions, despite the fact that impairment in
decision-making is a symptom of mental illness.147 The study
concluded that there was a “need for individualized
determinations of the competency question rather than across-theboard assumptions that mental illness equates with impaired
ability to make treatment decisions.”148 This finding echoes the
New York Court of Appeals holding in Rivers.149
Interestingly, under the precursor to Kendra’s Law, a court
could order “involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs”
only if the court found by “clear and convincing evidence that the
patient lack[ed] the capacity to make a treatment decision . . .
and the proposed treatment [wa]s narrowly tailored . . . .”150 The

146

Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal
and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL.’Y & L. 137 (1996)
(assessing the legal and public policy implications of involuntary
hospitalizations and informed consent after the MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study and arguing for a presumption of competence).
147
Id. at 140. In an attempt to assess different abilities related to
treatment decision-making, the MacArthur study researchers administered
three separate tests to six groups of patients and three groups of well persons
in the community matched on key demographic variables. Id. The tests used
cannot be directly equated with legal standards relating to competency. Id.
Although the study found that patients with mental illness as a group more
often manifested deficits on the measures of understanding, appreciation, and
reasoning, it also found that “on any given measure of decisional abilities, the
majority of patients with schizophrenia did not perform more poorly” than
other groups. Id. A minority of individuals with schizophrenia brought down
the mean. Id. at 142. Notably, “nearly half of the schizophrenia group and
76% of the depression group were found to perform in the ‘adequate
range . . . across all decision-making measures,’ and a significant portion
performed at or above the mean for persons without mental illness.” Id. at
144.
148
Id.
149
495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
150
§ 9.61(c)(2). The statute further stated that the proposed treatment
must “give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest in refusing
medication, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the
patient’s best interest, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the adverse
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Legislature deleted this provision from Kendra’s Law and failed
to include an alternative.151 Under Kendra’s Law, the court may
order an individual to take a prescribed medication as part of a
treatment plan.152
Although Kendra’s Law does not allow the “forcible
administration of medication,”153 an individual may be “ordered”
to take prescribed medication with severe consequences if he fails
to do so.154 The issue is one of semantics—a difference in
interpretation of “forcible administration” versus “ordered selfadministration.” Practically speaking, the patient has little choice
in deciding whether to take prescribed medication since
noncompliance may lead to arrest, involuntary hospitalization, or
both.155 Even some proponents of preventive commitment admit
that outpatient commitment statutes are “designed to circumvent
the rights of competent persons to refuse treatment.”156
Two lower court decisions have upheld the practice of
ordering patients to take prescribed medication under Kendra’s
Law.157 Specifically the courts found Kendra’s Law requires the
physician creating the treatment plan to provide the subject of the
side effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive alternative
treatments.” Id. The legislature, however, did not detail how the medication
order would work in practice. TELSON, supra note 50, at 19. Alarmingly,
researchers of the Bellevue Pilot Project found few thorough capacity
hearings, even though almost two-thirds of the initial orders included
medication provisions. Id. at 18, 19. Researchers were not aware, however, of
any incidences of medication being forcibly administered in the community.
Id. at 19.
151
§ 9.60.
152
§ 9.60(j)(4).
153
In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 868 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
154
§ 9.60(j)(4). “A court may order the patient to self-administer
psychotropic drugs or accept the administration of such drugs by authorized
personnel as part of an assisted outpatient treatment program.” Id.
155
§ 9.60(n). “The right to reject the treatment may be more of an empty
right than an actual one.” Watnik, supra note 14, at 1205.
156
Wisor, supra note 14, at 170.
157
In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re Martin,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001). See also
discussion supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the holdings of these two cases).
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petition “an opportunity to actively participate in the development
of such plan”158 and precludes forcing “drugs or treatment . . .
upon [an outpatient] if he fails to comply with the treatment
plan.”159 These findings, however, ignore the fact that the doctor
creates the treatment plan and the court makes the final decision
as to the plan.160 Both the physician and the court may even
disregard the patient’s wishes.161 Ultimately, the cases fail to
define the parameters of “opportunity to actively participate.”162
Although this oversight needs to be addressed, even if the patient
does participate, the court may still order forcible medication
against his wishes.163
The lower courts’ interpretations of the right to refuse
medication under Kendra’s Law do not protect an individual’s
right to the same extent as the Court of Appeals required in
Rivers.164 Although the lower courts interpret Kendra’s Law as
providing an opportunity to participate in treatment planning to
prevent an individual from being ‘forcibly medicated,’ they
disregard the fact that an individual has a greater right to refuse

158

714 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (quoting § 9.60(i)(1)).
In re Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31.
160
See generally In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862; In re Martin,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31.
161
§ 9.60(c)(8). “[A]ny directions included in [a health care] proxy shall
be taken into account by the court in determining the written treatment plan.”
Id. “Nothing herein shall preclude a person with a health care proxy from
being subject to a petition . . . .” § 9.60(d). A health care proxy is a document
that authorizes the power of another individual to make health care decisions
for or states the preferred treatment of an incompetent or incapacitated
individual. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 2980(8) (McKinney 2002).
162
In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re Martin,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31.
163
Hinds, supra note 14. “If forcible medication [i.e., an enforceable
court order requiring a patient to medicate himself] is permitted during
outpatient treatment, with fewer patient safeguards than are required for
[forcible medication, i.e., physically-forced administration of medication to an
unwilling patient, during] inpatient treatment . . . , outpatient commitment
loses much of its attractiveness as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient
hospitalization.” Id. at 371.
164
Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
159
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medication when involuntarily hospitalized under Rivers.165
Medication orders should not be part of an AOT order. If the
legislature and the courts continue to allow medication orders as
part of AOT orders, they should require a finding of
dangerousness or incapacity before allowing a medication order
to protect an individual’s right to refuse medication, thus
following Rivers.166
D. Physician-Patient and Psychotherapist Privileges
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
confidentiality in mental health treatment, finding that effective
therapy “depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in
which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. The mere
possibility of disclosure may impede the development of the
confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.”167
Recognizing the significant public policy interests in protecting
the psychotherapist privilege, the Supreme Court stated that the
privilege “serves the public interest by facilitating the provision
of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a
mental or emotional problem. The mental health of our citizenry,
no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent
165

495 N.E.2d 337, 344; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-48
(discussing the ability of the mentally ill to make medication decisions).
166
Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344; see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West
2002) (requiring a finding of dangerousness or incompetency before allowing
medication to be part of an outpatient commitment order).
167
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). In Jaffee, an administrator
of Ricky Allen’s estate brought a federal civil suit against Mary Lu Redmond,
a police officer, who had shot and killed Allen. Id. at 1. The court ordered a
social worker to give the administrator her notes from counseling sessions
with Redmond after the shooting. Id. Neither the social worker nor Redmond
complied. Id. The jury found for the plaintiff after being instructed that it
could “presume that the notes would have been unfavorable to respondents.”
Id. The Supreme Court ultimately held that rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence compels recognition of the psychotherapist privilege; therefore, the
privileged notes were protected from compelled disclosure. Id.; see also FED.
R. EVID. 501.
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importance.”168 Other reasons for the privilege of confidentiality
include reducing the stigma and discrimination that attaches with
certain mental illnesses, fostering trust in the therapeutic
relationship and ensuring privacy.169
The majority of states have adopted the psychotherapistpatient privilege as well as the physician-patient privilege, which
developed in the early nineteenth century.170 Although no
privilege exists in federal common law, federal courts recognize
state privilege laws if applicable to the proceedings.171 In the civil
168

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2.
See U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 8 (1999), at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/home.html; see also THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4 annots. (Am.
Psychiatric Assoc. 2001), available at http://www.psych.org/apa_members/
medicalethics2001_42001.cfm.
1. Psychiatric records, including even the identification of a person as
a patient, must be protected with extreme care. Confidentiality is
essential to psychiatric treatment. This is based in part on the special
nature of psychiatric therapy as well as on the traditional ethical
relationship between physician and patient . . . . 5. Ethically, the
psychiatrist may disclose only that information which is relevant to a
given situation. He/she should avoid offering speculation as fact.
Id.
170
Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1530 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications] (discussing indepth the medical and counseling privileges, their history and recent changes).
States originally created the privilege to foster public health by encouraging
people to seek medical treatment. Id. at 1532. Later, legislatures justified the
privilege to encourage patients to fully disclose all necessary information for
treatment. Id. at 1532-33. Beginning in the 1950s, when psychology and
psychotherapy gained legitimacy, legislatures extended the privilege to include
counselors, such as psychologists, social workers, school guidance counselors
and family therapists. Id. at 1540.
171
FED. R. EVID. 501. Privileges “shall be governed by principles of the
common law . . . in the light of reason and experience.” Id. When state law
applies, privileges “shall be determined in accordance with State law.” Id.
See, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2 (recognizing the state psychotherapist-patient
privilege in a federal civil action). “That it is appropriate for the federal courts
to recognize a psychotherapist privilege is confirmed by the fact that all 50
states and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of the
169
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commitment context, though, the general view is that the
physician-patient privilege is not applicable because it would
undermine the purpose of the hearings.172 Some jurisdictions,
however, have retained the right to raise the privilege.173
New York adopted the physician-patient privilege “on the
belief that fear of embarrassment or disgrace flowing from
disclosure of communications made to a physician would deter
people from seeking medical help and securing adequate
diagnosis and treatment.”174 New York, which in 1828 became
the first state to adopt the common law physician-patient
privilege, has a long history of upholding the privilege.175 New
privilege . . . .” Id.
172
See, e.g., In re T.C.F., 400 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1987) (holding the
privilege inapplicable in a commitment proceeding after finding a waiver by
respondent who introduced portions of his doctor’s records at the hearing); In
re Farrow, 255 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. App. 1979) (holding the privilege
inapplicable in a commitment proceeding); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally
Impaired Persons § 55 (1996) (providing an overview of the privilege and its
application in commitment proceedings). Some states argue that privilege is
inapplicable because it would undermine the purpose of commitment, because
individuals raise their mental status as a defense, and because a physician’s
affidavit is not testimony. Id.
173
See, e.g., In re Kathleen M., 493 A.2d 472 (N.H. 1985) (holding that
the privilege applies in commitment proceedings, but the privilege may be
overcome for compelling reasons); C.V. v. State, 616 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1987) (holding that trial court erred in admitting treating psychiatrist’s
testimony in commitment proceeding); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally
Impaired Persons § 55 (1996) (arguing that privilege should be retained
particularly when an individual voluntarily commits himself to a hospital or
when a physician is a “treating” doctor). Some jurisdictions retain the
privilege but make narrow exceptions in cases where it would be unreasonably
difficult to obtain an evaluation by another physician or where the treating
doctor is the only source available to testify. Id.
174
Williams v. Roosevelt Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. 1985); see
also RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (11th ed.
1995) (discussing the history of the privilege and its application, particularly in
New York).
175
Amin v. Rose F., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
6, 2000); Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126 (N.Y. 1989). In 1835, the
Court for the Correction of Errors recognized that the physician-patient
privilege barred a treating physician from testifying in a divorce proceeding.
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York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules 4504(a) states that
“[u]nless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to
practice medicine . . . shall not be allowed to disclose any
information which he acquired in attending a patient in a
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity.”176 New York has codified separate
privileges to cover therapeutic relationships with registered
psychologists and certified social workers, who are often mental
health treatment providers.177
Limited exceptions to the physician-patient privilege exist for
specific purposes. The CPLR, for example, sets out two
exceptions to the privilege: 1) “[a] dentist shall be required to
disclose information necessary for identification of a patient;”
and 2) specified medical personnel “shall be required to disclose
information indicating that a patient” under sixteen years old
“has been the victim of a crime.”178 The Legislature has also
limited the privilege in other statutes.179 Additionally, in Article
81 guardianship proceedings, the legislature made a specific
exception to the privilege—the court may authorize the court

Johnson v. Johnson, Lock. Rev. Cas. 141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); see also
Reinhan v. Dennin, 9 N.E. 320 (N.Y. 1886) (applying the privilege in
testamentary cases).
176
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002).
177
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4507, 4508 (McKinney 2002).
178
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(b) (McKinney 2002).
179
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 2002) (stating that
no privilege exists in proceedings for child abuse or neglect); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW §§ 413, 415 (McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege exists in
cases of suspected abuse or neglect); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2101(1)
(McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege exists in cases of communicable
diseases for public health reasons); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3373
(McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege exists in cases of narcotic
addictions); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 2002) (stating that no
privilege exists in cases of firearm or deadly knife wounds for penal reasons);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13 (McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege
exists for psychiatric records to enumerated individuals or agencies for
specific purposes); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(c)(1) (McKinney 2002)
(stating that no privilege exists in cases of court orders where the interests of
justice significantly outweigh the need for confidentiality).
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evaluator to inspect medical, psychological and psychiatric
records “notwithstanding the physician-patient privilege.”180 In
addition, courts have also recognized implied waivers of the
privilege in certain circumstances.181 The express “exceptions to
the privilege make clear the legislative concept that exceptions to
the statutorily enacted physician-patient privilege are for the
Legislature to declare.”182
New York courts have differed in determining whether the
statutory physician-patient privilege should bar treating
physicians from testifying in involuntary hospitalization
commitment proceedings. New York’s lower courts have
concluded that the privilege does not apply in commitment
proceedings.183 The Appellate Division, Third Department,
however, concluded that it was error to allow a patient’s personal
physician to testify in civil commitment proceedings.184
In enacting Kendra’s Law, the Legislature did not include an
exception to the privilege.185 The Legislature could easily have
provided an alternative by simply requiring an evaluation by a
court-ordered doctor as opposed to relying on an evaluation by
the treating physician. The Legislature did find that “[e]ffective
mechanisms for accomplishing [the goals of Kendra’s Law]
180

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(d) (McKinney 2002). Similarly, the
Legislature made a specific exception to the physician-patient privilege in
certain guardianship and custody proceedings. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 384b(3)(h) (McKinney 2002).
181
In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). Implied
waivers occur when a party affirmatively places his condition in controversy,
such as when a defendant pleads insanity in a criminal case. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002).
182
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 450 N.E.2d 678,
679 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that public interest in homicide case is not sufficient
to override statutory physician-patient privilege).
183
In re Benson, 16 N.Y.S. 111 (N.Y. County Ct. 1891); In re Allen,
204 N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). But see In re Barbara W., 537
N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the privilege, as to
communications made prior to admission, is not waived when an involuntarily
admitted inpatient challenges a retention hearing).
184
In re Gates, 170 A.D. 921 (1915).
185
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002).
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include . . . the improved dissemination of information between
and among mental health providers and general hospital
emergency rooms.”186 To meet this goal, the Legislature
amended the confidentiality provision of the Mental Hygiene
Law, but the change does not appear to have had any significant
impact.187
Despite New York’s long-standing reverence for the
physician-patient privilege, Kendra’s Law infringes upon the
right of the mentally ill to a confidential relationship with their
physicians by permitting their treating physicians to testify at
their court hearings.188 Patients and their advocates have argued
that the physician-patient privilege should bar the treating
physician from testifying.189 Given New York’s history regarding
the privilege, courts should not conclude that the Legislature
desired an implied waiver in Kendra’s Law.190
The lower courts, however, have determined that the
privilege does not apply to AOT hearings.191 In Amin v. Rose F.,
the court concluded that there is an implied waiver of the
privilege, finding that the Legislature “intended and desired” the
treating psychiatrist to be “intimately involved.”192 The court
186

1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2.
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(d) (McKinney 2002) (allowing
patient clinical information to be exchanged between and among licensed
mental health facilities and hospital emergency rooms throughout the state).
Surprisingly, there have been no challenges to the amended law.
188
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h)(2) (McKinney 2002). “The court
shall not order assisted outpatient treatment unless an examining physician . . .
testifies in person at the hearing.” Id. The testifying physician must state “the
facts which support the allegation that the subject meets each of the criteria for
assisted outpatient treatment, and the treatment is the least restrictive
alternative, the recommended assisted outpatient treatment, and the rationale
for the recommended assisted outpatient treatment.” § 9.60(h)(4).
189
See Amin v. Rose F., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 6, 2000); In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
190
See supra note 181 (discussing implied waivers).
191
See Amin v. Rose F., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31; In re Sullivan,
710 N.Y.S.2d 804.
192
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31. Rather than upholding the sanctity of
the privilege and its tradition, the court viewed the privilege negatively,
187
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held that the Legislature must have intended to waive the
privilege in Kendra’s Law.193 The court also analogized the AOT
hearing to a retention hearing, where physicians are allowed to
testify, to justify the waiver.194
In In re Sullivan, however, the court reached a different
conclusion, limiting the testimony of a treating physician.195 The
court in In re Sullivan found that “[t]he protection of the
physician-patient privilege extends only to communications and
not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning
that fact is an entirely different thing.”196 What information a
physician may reveal is unclear due to the complexity of
distinguishing “facts” from “communications.” The privilege
under C.P.L.R. 4504 covers not only “communications” but also
“any information . . . acquired” in attending a patient.197 The
court in In re Sullivan evaded the serious questions of privilege
and confidentiality because the respondent failed to specify what
information should be characterized as protected by the
privilege.198 Furthermore, the court held that the patient had the
finding that it is used as a “tactical maneuver . . . to suppress facts that are
injurious to the legal position of the person who seeks its protection.” Id.
193
Id. Furthermore, the court concluded, “[O]nce the privilege is waived,
it is waived for all purposes.” Id.
194
Id. See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31 (McKinney 2002)
(explaining the rules in a situation where a psychiatric inpatient is seeking
release, yet the hospital is seeking involuntary retention); In re Barbara W.,
537 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the privilege, as to
communications made prior to admission, is not waived when an involuntarily
admitted inpatient challenges a retention hearing). In a retention hearing, “any
physician-patient privilege . . . which [the patient] has does not extend to
communications with the physicians responsible for her involuntary
admission . . . .” Id.
195
710 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
196
Id.
197
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002); see also Michael Martin, The
Patient’s Privilege of Confidential Communication, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1997,
at 3.
198
Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06. See also Cohen, supra note 89
(providing a brief overview of In re Sullivan and other early cases that
challenge Kendra’s Law). “[T]he privilege question remains clouded and
undecided.” Id. at 4.
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burden of showing that the circumstances justified invoking the
privilege.199 Given the court’s ambiguous statement regarding
“facts” and “communications,” it is unclear what information a
physician may provide when testifying and what information
remains privileged.200
Similarly, Kendra’s Law creates confidentiality concerns for
community mental health providers—the treating psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, physicians and case managers—
regarding reporting noncompliance to the AOT case manager.201
According to a recent report on mental health by the Surgeon
General, confidentiality is a core ethical principle for all mental
health professionals.202 The New York state chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers warned that Kendra’s
Law violated social worker-client confidentiality, undermined the
treatment plan and prevented effective treatment by imposing
mandatory treatment, violating civil liberties.203 Involuntary
outpatient treatment providers have expressed concern with the
required “police” role, which conflicts with the therapeutic
role.204 If the provider must report noncompliance, a patient may
not be honest with his provider out of fear of repercussions.205
199

Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
201
Lawrence K.W. Berg, Ph.D., Esq., Presentation Before the Coalition
of Voluntary Mental Health Agencies, Inc., Assisted Out-Patient Treatment:
(Kendra’s Law) Implications for Community Mental Health Providers’
Responsibilities & Liabilities (n.d.) (on file with the author).
202
U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 169, at ch. 7.
203
Harvey Rosenthal, A Misguided Alternative to Fixing Our Mental
Health System (Jan. 2000) (arguing that involuntary outpatient commitment,
and Kendra’s Law in particular, are “false solutions and misguided public
policies borne out of fear and frustration with failure” of the mental health
system), at http://www.naswnyc.org/mhs5.html.
204
McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15. New York’s civil practice rule
4504, which requires certain medical professionals to disclose certain patient
information relating to a crime, governs treatment providers as well since it
refers to any and all “person[s] authorized to practice medicine . . . attending
a patient in a professional capacity.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002).
205
See Privileged Communications, supra note 170 (stating that some
individuals forego treatment to avoid the risk of stigma that follows from
200
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Dishonesty will not benefit a patient’s treatment.206 Clients may
fear the repercussion of hospitalization if they inform their
treatment provider that they did not take their medicine or
otherwise comply.207 “The preservation of confidentiality of
communications between therapist and patient may be a crucial
factor in the successful treatment of psychiatric problems.”208
Some patients might forego treatment entirely rather than risk
disclosure.209
To continue to protect the privilege, then, the treating
physician should not be the examining physician. The treating
physician should also not provide an affidavit or testimony
containing confidential information.210 The Legislature should
consider adding a provision to the statute that requires an
independent examiner.211 Although an independent examiner is
more costly in terms of time and money, an independent

public disclosure). Because information divulged to a therapist is so personal
and because of the social stigma attached to those seeking mental health
counseling, individuals might hesitate to seek treatment or disclose information
if any possibility of subsequent disclosure exists. Id. at 1543. For example,
when New York required doctors to report to the government the names of
those prescribed narcotics, some individuals discontinued use of the
medications or obtained them in other states. Id. at 1543.
206
U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 169. The Surgeon General’s
report noted that a 1995 study found that “as persons perceived themselves at
risk for serious sociolegal consequences, being informed that certain
disclosures would result in mandatory reporting, did limit self-disclosing.” Id.
207
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney’s 2002)
(discussing the implications of failure to comply with an AOT order).
208
53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 55 (1996).
209
See supra note 205 (discussing why patients might sacrifice treatment
altogether without assurances of confidentiality). Interestingly, proposed AOT
bills required community providers to report AOT noncompliance and
provided reporting providers with immunity from civil liability; the provision
was deleted from Kendra’s Law. Berg, supra note 201, at 11.
210
Cohen, supra note 89.
211
See Privileged Communications, supra note 170. To preserve the
privilege, “when an important issue at trial requires information regarding an
individual’s physical or emotional condition, that information should be
obtained through a court-ordered examination whenever possible.” Id.
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examiner could provide important protection to the privilege.212
Lastly, the Legislature should consider adding a provision that
clearly protects the privilege between treatment providers and
their patients to ensure patients provide full disclosure.
III. EFFECTIVENESS
Although forty states, not including New York, and the
District of Columbia currently have outpatient commitment laws
of various forms, twenty-three states rarely use them to order
treatment.213 Studies on outpatient commitment and the Bellevue
Pilot Project have had inconclusive findings.214 Although
Kendra’s Law has not been fully studied, statistics regarding
Kendra’s Law provide some insight into the law’s
effectiveness.215
A. Research and Statistics on Outpatient Commitment
Researchers have not found conclusive evidence that

212

Id.
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Health Policy Tracking
Service: Fact Sheet: Outpatient Civil Commitment (July 14, 1999), at http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/hpts.commit.htm. The researchers surveyed
the states’ use of outpatient commitment by self-report. Id. Six states reported
very common use; seven states reported common use; three states reported
occasional use; fourteen states reported rare use; and nine states reported very
rare use. Id. See also RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 15.
214
See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the findings of the Bellevue
Pilot Project studies); see also RIDGELY, supra note 35 (analyzing the
empirical evidence of various state studies on the effectiveness of involuntary
outpatient treatment). No studies exist on the cost-effectiveness of involuntary
outpatient treatment. RIDGELY, supra note 35.
215
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATUS REPORTS FOR
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (2001) [hereinafter STATUS REPORTS], at
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/Kendra_web/kstatus_rpts/statewide.htm.
Every month the New York State Office of Mental Health updates the
information on the website to reflect current data. Id.; see also discussion
infra Part III.B (providing statistics and analysis of the effectiveness of
Kendra’s Law).
213
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treatment is as effective when forced by court order as opposed
to non-mandated treatment.216 Advocates for the mentally ill
assert that individuals who might otherwise voluntarily participate
in treatment avoid such services out of fear of the possibility of
forced treatment later.217 One must question whether courtordered coercion will ever work for those mentally ill individuals
who simply refuse treatment.218 Coercion may actually prevent a
patient from participating in community treatment.219 Studies
have shown that individuals sometimes avoid treatment due to the
fear of commitment.220 “Patients are more likely to willingly
participate in a program when they believe that they are viewed
as equal partners with the professional staff” as opposed to being
viewed as individuals in need of treatment.221 The therapeutic

216

See John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond
Outpatient Commitment, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, Sept. 2001, at 1198
(discussing the findings of the Duke and Bellevue outpatient commitment
studies), available at http://macarthur.virginia.edu/article.pdf; RIDGELY,
supra note 35. Early studies finding limited positive results suffered from
significant methodological problems. Id. at xvi. Only two randomized clinical
trials of involuntary outpatient treatment exist—the Bellevue Pilot Project and
the Duke mental health study, but these studies had conflicting results. Id. at
xvii. Both studies suggest that improving the availability and quality of mental
health services leads to positive outcomes, but differ regarding the effect of
court mandates. Monahan, supra.
217
Monahan, supra note 216.
218
See, e.g., In re Endress, 732 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2001). Despite the fact that the respondent stated he would refuse to comply
long-term with any outpatient treatment plan or court order, the court ordered
AOT anyway. Id.
219
Wisor, supra note 14, at 172.
220
MadNation, Replacing Outpatient Commitment Initiatives with
Strategies that Work to Engage People in Need, at http://www.networksplus.
net/fhp/madnation/news/kendra/strategiesthatwork.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2002). One study found that fifty-five percent of patients reported avoiding
mental health services because of their prior experiences of being involuntarily
committed. Id. Another study found that forty-seven percent of patients
discharged from a hospital stated that the fear of being involuntarily committed
has caused them to avoid treatment on prior occasions. Monahan, supra note
216.
221
Wisor, supra note 14, at 172. See also Monahan, supra note 216
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relationship is unlikely to develop in a system based on
compulsion.222
A 1984 study of North Carolina’s outpatient commitment
statute found that success did not relate to coercion but rather to
staff dedication.223 Similar to the Bellevue Pilot Project study, the
North Carolina study found that those under outpatient
commitment did not fare significantly better on outcome
measures of living situation, rehospitalization, number of hospital
days, social contacts, employment, dangerousness and arrest as
compared to the control group.224 The study did find, however,
that those on outpatient commitment had lower rates of
medication refusal and treatment noncompliance.225 In addition,
they tended to stay in treatment longer.226
A more recent study of North Carolina’s outpatient
commitment statute, conducted by Duke University researchers,
found no significant differences regarding hospital use between
those on outpatient commitment and the control group at first
glance.227 The Duke Study did show, however, that extended
outpatient commitment—greater than 180 days—with intensive
outpatient services of three or more visits per month was
effective in reducing hospital admissions, lengths of stay, arrest
rates and violence.228
(discussing various studies on coercion and its negative effect on patients).
222
Wisor, supra note 14.
223
Id. at 172.
224
RIDGELY, supra note 35 (detailing studies on the effectiveness of
outpatient commitment in different states). The authors noted a number of
limitations of the Duke study: the length of time on outpatient commitment
was not randomly assigned; an adherence protocol ensured that enforcement
provisions were applied when applicable; and the study was limited to patients
discharged from hospitals. Id. at 25.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 23. The 331 participants were randomly assigned to one of the
two groups—outpatient commitment order or no order. Id. Individuals in both
groups, however, were assigned a case manager and received outpatient
treatment. Id.
228
Id. The average intensity of the outpatient services was seven services
per month. Id.
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A study of Tennessee’s outpatient commitment law had a
somewhat different outcome.229 The researchers found that
outpatient commitment was ineffective in reducing admission
rates among revolving door patients, which is often the cited goal
of preventive commitment.230 Other studies of various forms of
outpatient commitment in other states suggest a positive effect of
court orders in reducing hospital rates and length of stays.231
These studies, though, suffer from small sample size and other
limitations that restrict the validity and reliability of the studies.232
The empirical evidence is, thus, at best inconclusive.233
Even if mandated treatment is effective, the detrimental
impact on patients’ rights suggests that states should consider
other equally-effective voluntary methods.234 While court orders
act as leverage for some individuals, “the best studies suggest
that the effectiveness of outpatient commitment is linked to the
provision of intensive services. Whether court orders have any
effect at all in the absence of intensive treatment is an
unanswered question.”235 Further research is clearly needed,
however, in order to fully assess the law’s effectiveness.
B. Statistical Analysis of Kendra’s Law
According to the New York State Office of Mental Health
229

Id.
Id. at 22. In the Tennessee study, researchers conducted a
retrospective review of medical records of seventy-eight individuals
discharged with an outpatient commitment order compared to a match group
not under court orders. Id.
231
Id. at 19-21.
232
Id. Sample sizes included nineteen in a Massachusetts study, twenty in
an Ohio study, twenty-six in a New Hampshire study, and forty-two in a D.C.
study. Id.
233
See RIDGELY, supra note 35; BAZELON CENTER, POSITION
STATEMENT ON INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT (documenting further studies
regarding the effectiveness of outpatient civil commitment), at
http://www.bazelon.org/opcstud.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2001).
234
See discussion supra Part III.A (comparing findings on the
effectiveness of voluntary and involuntary programs).
235
RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 27.
230
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(“OMH”), 7,157 AOT investigations were conducted from
November 1999 to August 2002.236 Of those cases, 3,166 were
closed with no action taken.237 For the same period, merely 2,135
court orders were issued.238 Only 843 renewed orders have been
issued.239 During the same two and a half years, more than half
of the AOT petitions in New York City were dismissed.240 The
high number of dismissals of AOT petitions may be due to the
need to ration limited mental health services.241 The high number
of dismissals also suggests that too many individuals are
inappropriately referred for AOT. Another possible reason for
dismissal is that courts may be requiring the high level of
specificity as called for in the statute.242 In either case, Kendra’s
Law wastes expensive investigative and judicial resources,
especially if only about one of every four result in an order.243
236

STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. OMH oversees the state’s mental
health system, including operating psychiatric centers and regulating and
certifying various mental health programs operated by local governments and
non-profit agencies. New York State Office of Mental Health, About OMH, at
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2002). OMH is the state
agency with oversight of the state’s AOT program. Id.
237
STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215.
238
STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215.
239
Id. The Office of Mental Health does not provide statistics regarding
compliance with AOT orders. Id.
240
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATUS REPORTS FOR
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT—NEW YORK CITY (2001), at
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/ohmweb/Kendra_web/kstatus_rpts/nyc.htm.
Specifically, 2,143 out of 4,472 investigations were dismissed. Id. These
reports, unfortunately, do not state reasons for dismissal of petitions. STATUS
REPORTS, supra note 215.
241
Schacher, supra note 113, at 1.
242
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60. See also In re Sullivan, 710
N.Y.S.2d 853 (2000) (discussing the specificity needed).
243
See STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. OMH, however, believes that
Kendra’s Law has been effective in meeting its goals. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, PROGRESS REPORT ON NEW YORK STATE’S PUBLIC
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (2001) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT], available
at http://www.omh.state.ny.us. An evaluation of the first three months and the
first 141 individuals in AOT found that case management increased by 194%,
housing services increased by 107%, Mentally Ill-Chemically Addicted
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Another indication of Kendra’s Law’s ineffectiveness is the
state’s lack of use.244 As of June 2000, forty-five of the sixty-two
counties in New York had not used Kendra’s Law.245 As of
September 2002, three years after the law went into effect,
twenty-one counties have still not issued a single court order.246
Another twenty-three counties have issued orders in less than five
cases.247 For example, and not surprisingly, in the two and a half
years that Kendra’s Law has been in effect, Niagara and
Onondaga counties combined have only used court orders for two
people.248 The law cannot be effective if it is not used. Even
those counties that utilize Kendra’s Law do not obtain court
orders with any degree of frequency. Erie County, for example,
has created 168 agreements with patients to undergo outpatient
treatment voluntarily in lieu of AOT and sought only thirteen
court orders during the first year the law was in effect.249 When
the law initially went into effect, New York City estimated that
(MICA) services increased by 79%, medication management services
increased by 67% and therapy increased by 50%. Id. Additionally, the study
found that medication compliance increased by 129%, while harmful behavior
decreased by 26% and homelessness decreased by 100%. Id. at 18. This
study, however, suffers from small sample size and short-term effects, since it
was so early after the law went into effect. Additionally it suffers from
potential bias, since OMH conducted the study and oversees the AOT
programs. This study, therefore, should be critically examined.
244
See STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215 (providing monthly updates
regarding the use of Kendra’s Law across the state). Overall, an
overwhelming majority of the statewide investigations and court orders
occurred in New York City, which has taken individuals to court to force an
AOT order in 1,813 cases out of 7,360 statewide investigations. Id. New York
City also has a higher ratio of court orders to voluntary treatment agreements
than anywhere else in the state. Id.
245
Jaffe, supra note 116.
246
STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215.
247
Id.
248
E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Kendra’s Law Could Help
Mentally Ill Inmates, BUFFALO NEWS, July 28, 2002, at H5.
249
Gene Warner, Helping or Hurting?, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 30, 2001, at
A1. As of September, 2002, Erie County has drafted 222 voluntary
agreements and only sought court orders in thirty-seven cases. STATUS
REPORTS, supra note 215.
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7,000 individuals would be eligible for AOT,250 yet less than
2,000 court orders have been issued in the city since Kendra’s
Law’s inception.251
C. Additional Factors
Other less coercive methods may be equally effective as AOT
in accomplishing the stated goals of Kendra’s Law—stopping
revolving door patients and protecting society from the
dangerously mentally ill.252 The most successful community
programs ensure a wide array of services.253 Indeed, OMH
recently acknowledged the effectiveness of intensive case
management in reducing inpatient hospital days.254 Additionally,
the money may be better spent on community resources rather
than court intervention.255 Lastly, education to increase a patient’s
understanding of his mental illness is a key factor in successful
treatment.256 A voluntary community program offering intensive
case management, psycho-education and respect for the
individual may be as effective as Kendra’s Law in reducing the
rates of hospitalization, arrest, homelessness and violence.
Moreover, many individuals with mental illness feel further

250

Jaffe, supra note 116.
STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215.
252
See Monahan, supra note 216.
253
Wisor, supra note 14, at 172.
254
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 243. Intensive case management (ICM)
means that a case manager is assigned only a small number of cases in order
to ensure individuals receive an intensive level of services. According to the
report, ICM clients had a decline in inpatient days by twenty-three days as
compared to a control group that had eleven fewer days. Id. at 8.
255
Moran, supra note 33. To implement the law, the state has allocated
more funding for community programs and discharge planning. Schacher,
supra note 113. Although some have praised the New York Legislature for its
funding of community services at a high level after the passage of Kendra’s
Law, others have expressed concern about future funding because of the need
to maintain a high level of spending in order for the law to be successful.
RIDGELY, supra note 35.
256
Winick, supra note 146.
251
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stigmatized by the AOT proceedings.257 Additionally Kendra’s
Law fails to consider that an individual’s treating therapist or
physician is in the best position to determine a client’s treatment
needs.258 AOT orders also displace individuals who voluntarily
seek treatment and for whom treatment may be more
beneficial.259 These non-economic costs of AOT suggest
voluntary treatment is a better alternative.
Lastly, Kendra’s Law does not effectively protect society
from violent, mentally ill individuals.260 Two recent examples
demonstrate that New York continues to be plagued by
incidences of violence caused by individuals with mental illness.
In November 2001, a severely mentally ill man, Jackson Roman,
pushed a woman in front of a moving subway train.261 Roman
told investigators he pushed her because he was desperate for
psychiatric help.262 Although it is unknown whether Roman was
under an AOT order, either way, the mental health system,
including Kendra’s Law, failed to serve Roman and to protect
society.263 If he was under an AOT order, he should have been
picked up and hospitalized for failure to comply after he left his
program. If he was not under an AOT order, one must ask how
257

June M. Briese, Treat Mentally Ill with Dignity, N.Y.L.J., May 1,
2002, at § 5. Many “feel as if they are being treated like criminals in the
[m]ental [h]ealth [s]ystem when they appear for their court proceedings.” Id.
258
See Hinds, supra note 14.
259
McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15.
260
See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing the legislative
findings and purpose of Kendra’s Law).
261
Jones, supra note 4. In August of 2002, Roman was sentenced to
twenty-two years for the incident after pleading guilty. Dareh Gregorian,
Grand Central Subway Pusher Gets 22 Years, N.Y. POST, Aug. 22, 2002;
Barbara Ross, 22 Years in Subway Push, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 22, 2002.
See also Editorial, Is Kendra’s Law Enough?, N.Y. POST, Nov. 24, 2001, at
20 (arguing that Kendra’s Law failed since Jackson Roman was able to do
what he did).
262
Sean Gardiner, Psychiatric Motive? Subway Suspect Tells Cops He
Pushed Woman to Get Mental Help, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 2001, at A7. A
police officer recalled taking Roman to a local psychiatric hospital recently for
an evaluation because of his strange behavior in the subway. Id.
263
Id.
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he was overlooked. In March 2002, Peter Troy, who suffers
from paranoid schizophrenia, shot and killed a priest and
parishioner in the middle of mass in Long Island.264 His case
raises even more alarming questions regarding the effectiveness
of Kendra’s Law because the Nassau County Department of
Mental Health Commissioner acknowledged that Troy’s AOT
case simply fell through the cracks.265 Hospital doctors referred
Troy’s case to the county for AOT.266 Insufficient staffing, large
caseloads, and the inability to locate Troy forced his case to be
closed without any investigation or hearing.267 Although the
Legislature hoped to end these types of violent incidences by
individuals with mental illness through enactment of Kendra’s
Law, the continuation of the problem demonstrates its
ineffectiveness.268

264

Lauren Terrazzano & Roni Rabin, Warnings Unheeded: County was
Unable to Monitor Violent Patient Because He Could Not Be Found,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 2002, at A5. Peter Troy was arrested three times since
2000 for bizarre behavior. Id. The year before the incident, he was
hospitalized at Bellevue for a month. Id. Bellevue told Nassau County
Department of Mental Health about Troy. Id. After his discharge, he was
arrested the same month, again due to bizarre behavior, and taken to a hospital
on Long Island. Id. See also Kieran Crowley & Andy Geller, How Law Failed
Slain Priest, N.Y. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at 8; Peter C. Campanelli et al., Job
Vacancies at Fault, NEWSDAY, Mar. 29, 2002, at A41. “As a psychiatric
patient with a long, documented history of violence, Troy did not receive the
services and follow-up that were to be assured by the passage of the wellfunded 1999 legislation, Kendra’s Law, which mandates outpatient treatment
for people whose histories are similar to Troy’s.” Id.
265
Terrazzano & Rabin, supra note 264.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text (noting the continuing
problem of violence by the mentally ill despite Kendra’s Law). Additionally,
the story of Rosemary Murray suggests the law’s ineffectiveness. Rocco
Parascandola, Help for Ill Restricted By Standards, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 2002,
at A28. Murray’s family was shocked when doctors who cared for Murray, a
paranoid schizophrenic, said she could not be forced into treatment or an
institution because she was not considered dangerous. Id. At times, Murray
was a productive member of society, but then she would stop taking
medication and deteriorate. Id. There was no “catastrophic moment” that
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CONCLUSION
As one commentator stated, Kendra’s Law is “neither a boon
nor a bust,” concluding that “[l]egislators, lawyers, the judiciary,
and mental heath professionals must continue to analyze the
effects of Kendra’s Law to determine, ultimately, whether it
helped to remedy some of the problems it was created to remedy,
or if it created intractable problems for mentally ill individuals
and for society.”269 Despite research regarding the lack of
effectiveness of involuntary outpatient commitment generally,
New York passed Kendra’s Law as an emotional response to a
tragedy caused by an individual with mental illness. Although the
Legislature carefully crafted Kendra’s Law to narrowly define
those eligible for AOT, it did not go far enough in crafting
procedural safeguards to protect the rights of those who suffer
from a mental illness. Given the findings that involuntary
outpatient commitment has little effect, money may be better
spent on enhancing mental health services for those who want
treatment, which would also allow individuals to retain their
invaluable rights.
Kendra’s Law automatically expires in 2005, according to the
sunset provision, unless the legislature acts to renew it.270 Before
renewing the law, however, the legislature should clarify the
problematic elements discussed in this note and provide funding
and resources for further research on the efficacy of the law and
the treatment programs. Some recommendations for the
legislature to consider include (1) requiring the treatment plan to

would have led to commitment. Id. Murray’s sister stated she was told “they
can’t commit her unless she commits a crime, or tries to kill herself or
somebody else.” It is unclear if the family pursued an AOT order, but Murray
was recently found dead in a lake in Central Park. Id. Although the events
leading to Murray’s death are unknown, her mother believes that voices in
Murray’s head were responsible. Rocco Parascandola, End of a Lifelong
Battle, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 2002, at A06. Apparently, those same voices had
caused Murray “to drink water from the curb.” Id.
269
Susan L. Pollet, Has Kendra’s Law Been a Boon or a Bust?,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at 1.
270
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney’s 2002).
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be submitted with the petition, (2) extending the time before the
hearing, (3) allowing individuals the right to refuse medication
without consequence, and (4) requiring an independent examiner
as opposed to allowing the patient’s current treating physician to
be an examiner. Only a proper balancing of an individual’s
autonomy and privacy with the state’s interest will provide due
respect for individuals with mental illness, ensure effective
treatment, and protect society from those who need more
intensive treatment.

